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BURUNDI: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK
THE URGENT NEED FOR A NEW NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The attempted coup d’etat by a group of young
army officers against President Pierre Buyoya on
18 April 2001 was a grave warning about the peace
process in Burundi. More than eight months after
its signing, in August 2000, the Arusha peace
accord is at an impasse. Questions that were
unresolved at the time have still not been dealt
with and the conditions for the accord's
implementation have not improved. There is no
cease-fire in sight between the army and rebel
groups, and the leadership of transition envisaged
at Arusha has still not been chosen. Moreover, the
Implementation and Monitoring Committee (IMC)
seems to be ineffective and incapable of fulfilling
its mission.
Nelson Mandela, in spite of receiving the support
of regional heads of state and the international
community, has failed persuade the rebel groups to
renounce violence and accept the terms of the
Arusha accord. Far from weakening their position,
the death of Laurent Kabila appears to have
convinced the rebels to go ahead with their long-
planned offensive against Burundi, which remains
the weakest link in the anti-Kinshasa alliance.
From a situation of “Neither War nor Peace”1,
Burundi is sliding once again towards widespread
civil war. Both the army and the rebels are now
preparing for a major confrontation.
In the mean time, the political drama continues,
with neither of the proposed leadership scenarios
of the current president/vice president or ex-
1 "Burundi: Neither Peace nor War", ICG Africa Report
N°25, 1 December 2000.
interior minister/ex-secretary-general of
FRODEBU permitting an impartial or satisfactory
implementation of the peace accord. The first
scenario is nothing but a dangerous continuation of
the status quo, demonstrating the regime’s
reluctance to relinquish power, while the second
may reflect a real change of head of state, but
would give legitimacy to another "institutional
deadlock".
With security deteriorating, a humanitarian
catastrophe underway, and political fragmentation
in both camps, the limited achievements of the
Arusha accord are shrivelling to nothing. Although
part of the responsibility for the obstruction of the
peace process lies with President Buyoya, he is
becoming the major target of resentment and faces
the real risk of assassination. Such an event would
undoubtedly provoke a reckoning between political
leaders, and renewed ethnic violence.
It would be counterproductive to press for the
implementation of an empty accord. However, the
status quo is just as dangerous and must not be
allowed to continue, as the war option becomes
more likely. A radical change in the management
of the peace process is therefore needed.
Nelson Mandela should offer Pierre Buyoya an
honourable exit strategy, but must also obtain
assurances that the current political-military power
structures will be dismantled. A power-sharing
agreement should be negotiated, but only between
UPRONA (Union for National Progress) and
FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi). All
other small political parties should be excluded
from these initial negotiations. The agreement
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should then be sealed with the drafting of a
transitional constitution, to decrease the risk of
manipulation of the institutions during the
transition period. The format of the IMC should
also be revised.
A cease-fire will never be established until the
peace processes of Burundi and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) are harmonised,
especially in relation to the so-called “negative
forces”, and as long as DRC President Joseph
Kabila and Tanzania’s President Benjamin Mkapa
do not engage personally in the negotiations. An
agreement to provide incentives to those who stop
fighting, and sanctions against those who refuse,
should be imposed by Burundi’s donors.
Beyond the region, Nelson Mandela should build a
united international position for the resolution of
the conflict. Burundi should not be subjected to
competition between English and French speaking
mediators. Nor should leaders of the
PALIPEHUTU-FNL be able to go to Pretoria
while CNDD-FDD leaders meet Burundi’s
representatives in Gabon’s capital Libreville to
negotiate identical issues of a cease-fire and the
reform of the armed forces.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE FACILITATOR NELSON MANDELA:
1. Clarify mediation responsibilities between
Libreville and Pretoria. President Mandela
could negotiate the departure of Pierre
Buyoya while South African Vice President
Zuma could finalise an agreement on power-
sharing between UPRONA and FRODEBU.
President Omar Bongo of Gabon could take
responsibility for cease-fire negotiations with
the FDD and FNL. This redistribution of
tasks should be ratified by the members of
the Regional Initiative for Burundi.
2. Recruit an international team of professional
mediators to work full time on Burundi.
Appoint an official to liaise with the Lusaka
peace process (DRC).
3. In South Africa, bring together the
international actors involved in the peace
process, (members of the Regional Initiative
on Burundi, President Bongo of Gabon,
President Kabila of DRC, President Mugabe
of Zimbabwe, members of the UN Security
Council, a representative of the UN Secretary
General, and officials from Belgium) to
discuss the creation of a united front and a
common strategy to deal with the Burundi
crisis.
4. Invite Pierre Buyoya to South Africa
immediately to negotiate the terms of his
political departure. These terms should then
be presented to the UNSC, and endorsed by
the international community. If Buyoya
refuses, he should be threatened with
personal sanctions (freezing of overseas
assets, legal action, visa restrictions etc).
Seek a UNSC resolution calling on member
states to back the sanctions.
5. Once guarantees have been obtained for the
departure of Buyoya, a transitional team of
president and vice president can be named.
Domitien Ndayizeye should be named
transitional vice president on condition that
talks on power-sharing between UPRONA
and FRODEBU succeed and a transitional
constitution is drafted.
6. Hold private meetings with UPRONA and
FRODEBU on the drafting of a transitional
constitution, and review the operation of the
CSAA. The results of these talks should
constitute the Pretoria Accord, which will
complement the Arusha accord.
7. Submit the revised peace project, in the form
of the Pretoria accord, to the 19 signatories
of the Arusha accord for ratification. Those
who refuse should be excluded from the
institutions of transition.
8. Demand an immediate truce simultaneously
from Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye,
Agathon Rwasa and Pierre Buyoya, and their
swift engagement in unconditional cease-fire
negotiations and reform of the security
forces. The result of these talks should
constitute the Libreville Accord, to
complement those of Arusha and Pretoria.
9. Facilitate contact between FRODEBU,
CNDD and FROLINA and those combatants
who wish to disarm so that they will obtain a
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mandate; bring together the three parties as
well as the Burundian government to open
negotiations on the reform of the security
forces. The result of these negotiations will
constitute Protocol II of the Pretoria Accord,
to be ratified in the same way as the
Libreville Accord.
10. Seek assistance from the government of
Tanzania to establish a system of receiving,
recording and identifying rebel forces who
wish to lay down their arms. They will be
given priority in the reform of the armed
forces and the program of reintegration and
should be able to choose their own
representative to the Libreville talks.
TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
11. Urge the Secretary General to be actively
involved in the implementation of the peace
process, including providing regular reports
to the Security Council and eventually
signing the Pretoria and Libreville Accords
as an observer.
12. Pass a resolution urging the Secretariat to
begin the process of securing stand-by
arrangements with troop contributors for the
deployment of a peace keeping force within
30 days of the signing of the new peace
accords. The mandate of such a force could
include assistance to governments in
monitoring Burundi's borders on Lake
Tanganyka, in the Rusizi plain and near the
refugee camps in Tanzania. Expand
MONUC's mandate to assist border
monitoring between DRC and Burundi.
13. Press President Joseph Kabila to immediately
and unconditionally end support to the
Burundi Hutu rebel groups.
14. If the leaders of the FDD and FNL refuse to
declare a truce and participate in
unconditional cease-fire negotiations and
reform of the security forces, put in place the
following measures:
•  Ask all the signatories to the Arusha
peace accord to condemn those rebels
who refuse to negotiate; officially
declare them to be called “negative
forces.” Impose UN sanctions on those
rebel forces and their supporters with
appropriate monitoring and reporting
mechanisms.
•  With the support of the international
community, the governments of
Tanzania and DRC, put in place an
agreed plan to neutralise and disarm
these Burundian  rebel forces in co-
ordination with the Joint Military
Commission plan, established under
the Lusaka Agreement.
TO BURUNDI’S FINANCIAL BACKERS:
15. Begin to release funds promised at the
December 2000 conference in Paris to put
the economy back on a productive footing,
and assist the health and education sectors,
with special attention to activities focusing
on decentralisation.
16. Put in place strict controls on the use of aid
to avoid its misappropriation, and tie
conditions for payments to the dismantling of
the private interests at the heart of power in
the political-military oligarchy.
Brussels/ Nairobi, 14 May 2001
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BURUNDI: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK
THE URGENT NEED FOR A NEW NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 28, 2000, the nineteen parties to the
Burundi conflict signed a peace accord in Arusha
in the presence of the regional heads of state and
the US President, Bill Clinton. The accord, signed
in extremis, did not include a cease-fire. The main
rebel leaders could not be convinced to take part in
the peace process. Eight months after signature of
the accord, the peace process has made almost no
progress, and none of the questions left answered
by the Arusha accord have been resolved.
Since the start of the year 2001, two sessions of the
Arusha accord implementation and monitoring
committee (IMC) and a summit of the heads of
state of the Regional Initiative on Burundi have
been held, without significant results. The six-
month ‘interim’ period expired in February without
a cease-fire and without unanimous nomination of
a transitional President. As a sign of the deadlock,
war flared up again in September 2000 between
governmental troops and rebel groups of the
National Liberation Forces (FNL)2 and the
National Council for the Defence of Democracy -
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-
FDD)3.
The main virtue of the signature of the Arusha
accord was that it closed a cycle of negotiations,
whose formula (i.e. including all the political
parties but not the main rebel groups) had reached
its limits. The main result was thus to obtain a
minimal political agreement, particularly with
2 FNL, vide infra.
3 FDD, vide infra.
regard to the origins of the conflict, the paths to
reconstruction of the country, and for the first time,
the role and composition of the army and its
relationships with civilian power.4 However, the
Arusha accord did not give rise to any results, in
the absence of the rebel chiefs. In fact, the day
after the signature of the accord, the rebel leaders
increased the military pressure on several fronts.
Since September 2000, thirteen out of the country's
fifteen provinces have been hit by war. The FNL
even initiated direct attacks on the town of
Bujumbura, shelling various peripheral quarters of
the city and temporarily occupying the Kinama
district (northern suburb) in February and March.
Simultaneously, the FDD continued to launch
operations in the south of the country, near the
frontier with Tanzania. The Libreville meetings
between President Pierre Buyoya and the leader of
the FDD, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye,
conducted under the auspices of Omar Bongo and
Laurent Kabila, then his son Joseph Kabila, on
January 9, then April 17, 2001, were not followed
by any tangible effect. The sudden death of
Laurent Kabila, considered to be giving military
support to the Burundian rebellion, and his
succession by his son, Joseph, do not seem to have
changed the war-like determination of their
protégés in any way. In fact, it appears to have
triggered Laurent Kabila’s plan of September 1999
to ‘move the war towards the East, by first
attacking Burundi’. Currently, the FDD and FNL
appear to be coordinating their attacks. A new
4 Cf. ICG, ‘The Mandela Effect. Evaluation and
Perspectives of the Peace Process in Burundi’, Central
Africa Report No. 13, 18/04/00, and ICG, ‘Burundi :
Ni guerre ni paix’, op. cit..
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offensive on Bujumbura is expected in the coming
days.
The direct consequence of the resumption of
violence has been a dramatic worsening of the
situation. At Bujumbura, over 50,000 people have
been displaced following the February attacks. In
the hills, displacements due to the fighting have
produced an explosion in malaria epidemics and
bacterial diseases, dramatically worsening the
humanitarian situation, which was already
catastrophic. The resurgence of violence has also
resulted in a hardening of political positions.
Buyoya’s government, under pressure from the
thirteen signatory political parties to quit its
functions over the transitional period, now
conditionally defers the set-up of a new executive
to prior signature of a cease-fire with the rebels.
Conversely, Buyoya’s rejection by the signatory
political parties reveals a dangerous dissociation
between the military and political thinking in
Burundi. Despite the security threat, the Tutsi
camp has not managed to reunite behind the head
of state and, despite its commitment to restoring
the constitutional legitimacy of 1993, the Hutu
camp has not succeeded in uniting against the head
of state. The dramatic fragmentation of the
political forces in Burundi has become a threat to
the peace process.
Application of the principles stated in the Arusha
accord (i.e. good governance, an end to ethnic
chauvinism, an end to impunity) is not appealing to
the majority of the Burundian political class, which
hopes to reproduce, over the transitional period,
the neo-patrimonial practices of its peers, and
profit from the USD 440 million promised by the
international community at the Paris Conference in
December 2000. Similarly, many political figures
continue to believe that obtaining power by
negotiation represents a form of redemption that
will not only guarantee  impunity for past crimes,
but also enable them to increase their wealth.
All that must stop. Given its state of economic
dilapidation, Burundi can no longer allow its
politicians to share out its national resources
between them. The peace process must produce
change, and that change must include the end of
impunity for both camps and the end of the
monopolisation of the country’s meagre resources
by the governing elite.
Thus, the transition must necessarily be freed from
the belligerents’ threats and the hold of the
political parties before the accord can be
implemented. In order for the spirit of Arusha to
survive, its current institutional legacy must be
considered insufficient and a radical change in
governance must be ensured, in particular by
drafting a transitional constitution, eliminating
misappropriation by the powerful, and reviewing
the make-up and operations of the Peace accord
implementation and monitoring committee.
A. A CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IMPROBABLE
The resurgence of violence and the deterioration of
the security situation in Burundi have accelerated
since the signature of the peace accord in August
2000. A critical point occurred with the temporary
occupation of the Kinama quarter (Northern suburb
of Bujumbura) in February-March 2001, and the
deterioration has continued without a break since,
particularly in the centre and south of the country.
Since September 2000, almost all of the provinces
have been affected by the fighting. Only Ngozi,
Kirundo, Kayanza (North) and Karuzi (centre)
have, for the time being, been spared.
For the Burundian rebels, the gradual
intensification of military operations following the
signature of the peace accord reflects several
objectives. First, it showed defiance against those
who seek to impose on the rebels the terms of a
document that they themselves did not negotiate.
Second, it sought to show that no agreement is
possible without the rebels and that the rebels do
not take seriously the threat of regional sanctions
issued at the Nairobi summit in September 2000.
That threat was, in any case, not very convincing.
Third, the resumption of fighting was also aimed at
reaffirming the political and military weight of the
belligerents, in the run-up to the deadline for the
start of the transitional period. For the leaders of
the FNL and the FDD, the recourse to violence has
become a means to thwart any significant advance
in the peace process in the absence of the rebels.
The escalation of violence has also enabled
resolution of certain challenges to the leadership in
the two movements and strengthened the rebels’
positions pending future negotiations with the
government.
However, seeking to strengthen military positions
before negotiating is a zero-sum game. The
Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock,
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Burundian government, while militarily weakened
but nonetheless undefeated, will refuse to negotiate
until it has regained an advantage in the field. In
the final analysis, then, the fighting will last
indefinitely, although there is a possibility that,
with the progress in the Congolese peace process
and Joseph Kabila’s need to honour his
commitments with respect to the ‘armed groups’
identified by the Lusaka accord, the rebels may
lose their current negotiating positions, become
weaker and break up. Moreover, irrespective of
whether the violence is elicited for purposes of
internal remobilization, employed to convey a
political message to the region, or used as a tactic
to strengthen positions prior to negotiating, the
resurgence of violence has two dramatic
consequences for Burundi: first, the fighting is
exacerbating the ethnic hatred underlying the
conflict; and secondly, it is worsening the
humanitarian catastrophe already underway,
gradually killing off the hopes to which the peace
process gave rise.
B. THE FDD FROM LIBREVILLE I TO
LIBREVILLE II: OUT WEST, NOTHING
MUCH NEW?
1. The initial shock: Laurent Kabila's legacy
The end of the year 2000 in fact coincided with the
resumption of fighting in the Congo. The offensive
of the Congolese armed forces (FAC), the
victorious counter-offensives of the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) and the targeting of the
towns of Pepa and Pweto in Katanga by rebels of
the Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma
(RCD-Goma) - have all resulted in the rout of the
FAC, their allies, the FDD, and the former
Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR), despite support
from the Zimbabwean artillery and aviation.5
Fearing that Lubumbashi would be taken and a
new Rwandan offensive would be launched against
Katanga and Eastern Kasai, Laurent Kabila took
the diplomatic initiative, with the support of the
French government, by bringing the leader of the
FDD, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, to Libreville
to meet with Pierre Buyoya, whom Kabila
considered the weak link in the Eastern alliance.
5 For further details, cf. ICG ‘Scramble for the Congo.
Anatomy of an Ugly War’, Central Africa Report No.
26, 20/12/00.
The meeting on January 9, 2001, facilitated by
President Bongo of Gabon, must be seen in the
context of the Paris round-table, held at Nelson
Mandela’s initiative in December 2000. The
mediator again requested the assistance of the
French government in bringing the Burundian
rebels to the negotiating table, admitting that he
was himself incapable of doing so. The leaders of
the Regional Initiative on Burundi also showed
themselves incapable of putting enough pressure
on the rebels to join the negotiations.6 After having
prompted a meeting between Laurent Kabila and
Pierre Buyoya in Abuja on December 24, 2000, the
French government mobilised its networks to
convince Laurent Kabila to bring Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye to Libreville at the start of
January.7
Laurent Kabila in fact considered Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye as responsible for the Pweto
defeat, which increased the risk of exposing
Lubumbashi to a Rwandan offensive.8 At the end
of August 2000, immediately before the signature
of the peace accord and without the approval of
Kinshasa, 800 to 1000 members of the FDD
deserted the Congolese defences in Katanga to
conduct an offensive against Burundi.9 Laurent
Kabila considered Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye
responsible for the departure of the FDD units,
which had been incorporated into the FAC,
weakening the Congolese defence lines, reducing
their firepower and breaking the chain of
command. To general surprise, the Libreville
meeting was thus catastrophic for the rebel leader.
He met his main enemy face-to-face for the first
time, and Laurent Kabila, his mentor, attacked him
openly.10
The Libreville meeting weakened the rebel leader
with respect to the Burundian head of the state.
While the rebel leader undoubtedly gained
international stature and met face-to-face with
Buyoya, as an equal and as the only spokesman for
6 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
7 AFP, ‘Buyoya-FDD meeting: the peace process
progresses thanks to Kabila’, 10/01/01.
8 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
9 Cf. vide infra.
10 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
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the rebels11, the meeting also confirmed the
precariousness of the rebel leader’s position in
Congo. Moreover, the surprise meeting led the
FDD’s staff officers to suspect their leader,
Ndayinkengurukiye, of a secret arrangement with
the other leader, Buyoya, both from the Bururi
province, to the detriment of rebels from the
country’s other provinces.12
Ultimately, Pierre Buyoya was the one to profit
from the Libreville meeting. The meeting only
resulted in the formulation of a position of
principle: opening a dialogue between the
government and the FDD, under South-African
mediation.13 But, Pierre Buyoya presented himself,
in a French-speaking environment, as a man of
peace, where he was able to reaffirm his legitimacy
as head of state, under the patronage of one of his
peers. Pierre Buyoya also asserted himself as the
only person authorised to negotiate a cease-fire
with the rebels, in preparation for the battle for the
transitional leadership. Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye returned home weaker, even if
he had achieved a new international stature.14
2. Libreville II, and afterwards?
The death of Laurent Kabila and his replacement
by his son, Joseph, has not necessarily re-
established the position of Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye as an influential commander of
the FAC. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye arrived in
Kinshasa on January 16, 2000, to accompany
Laurent Kabila to the Yaoundé French-speaking
nations summit, and left triumphally for
Lubumbashi, a few days after the coup,
strengthened by his friendly relations with the new
head of state.15 He was not, however, authorised to
attend the funeral of Laurent Kabila, although he
had returned to Kinshasa for that purpose. Since
then, he is reported to not have the same direct
11 Ibid.
12 ICG interview, FDD sympathizer, Bujumbura,
08/02/01.
13 AFP, ‘Buyoya-FDD meeting: the peace process
progresses thanks to Kabila’, 10/01/01.
14 Remark by a member of the political bureau of the
FNL, Bujumbura, 10/01/01.
15 ICG interview, member of the FDD, Bujumbura,
07/02/01.
access to the new Congolese head of state, his
former comrade-in-arms.16
The second Libreville meeting on 17 April 2001
yielded no greater results than the first. It was
undoubtedly important that the meeting took place,
enabling Joseph Kabila to express his commitment,
like his father, to supporting the Burundi peace
process. However, on that occasion, President
Buyoya, strengthened by his success at Libreville I
in January and probably irritated by the last-minute
cancellation, by the FDD, of a similar meeting
scheduled for March 26, formulated conditions for
the discussions from the outset at Libreville II. The
rebels considered those conditions unacceptable.
The President indicated that he had come to
Libreville as a representative of the nineteen
political parties who were signatories to the accord
and that, furthermore, all discussion with the FDD
could only take place in that context and be
restricted to the question of the cease-fire. That
position of principle reduced Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye to the status of a potential
twentieth signatory to the peace accords who could
only accept the terms of the Arusha accord for all
questions other than that of the cease-fire.17
However, the FDD wanted to reach a political and
military agreement separate from the logic of the
Arusha accord, whose validity they had rejected at
Libreville.18
That position blocked the discussions from the
outset and gave rise to sharp tension between the
FDD and the South-African Vice President, Jacob
Zuma, who was accused by the FDD of having
become the government’s partisan.19 In fact, absent
from the first meeting and having come to
16 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
17 Telephone interview, member of the facilitation team,
22/04/01.
18 IRIN, Great Lakes update No. 1161, 20/04/01, and
office of the Coordinator general and President of the
political bureau, ‘CNDD-FDD declaration on the
Arusha peace accord, signed on August 28, 2000’,
17/09/00.
19 President Omar Bongo had to make use of all his
authority and even threaten the rebels in order for
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye to finally agree to meet
Jacob Zuma on the night of April 17. The former had
refused the meeting throughout the afternoon and
evening. ICG interview, Western diplomat,
Bujumbura, 24/04/01.
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Libreville on March 26 for nothing, Vice President
Zuma’s status as an impartial mediator was
severely jeopardised by the request that Nelson
Mandela sent to the Secretary General of the
United Nations at the end of February, calling for
mobilisation of an international force to impose
peace in Burundi, under chapter VII of the UN
charter. That request meant that, by favouring
international military intervention in place of
negotiation, Mandela disqualified the rebels as
credible parties to the negotiations. South-African,
Ghanaian and Nigerian troops had already been
considered for participation in the force.20
In addition, despite a ‘clarification’ meeting
between Vice President Zuma and the leader of the
FDD in Kinshasa on April 9, the relations between
the South-African facilitator and the rebels remain
difficult.21 Jacob Zuma finally stated that the
negotiations in Gabon could only deal with
technical questions relating to the cease-fire. All
other subjects, including the reform of the army,
could only be addressed in the Arusha
framework.22 Pierre Buyoya was thus perfectly in
line with the framework indicated by the
facilitator, while being slightly provocative. The
positioning in Libreville also enabled Pierre
Buyoya to give assurances to the Regional
Initiative on Burundi concerning his fidelity to the
Arusha process, and once again strengthened his
position as a candidate for the transitional
leadership, while maintaining his reputation as a
moderate man of peace, confronted with
intransigent rebels on one side, and narrow-minded
extremists on the other. Such a positioning could
only receive the approval of Kigali,23 which was
consulted on the subject during a surprise trip by
President Buyoya at Easter.
Ultimately, the second Libreville meeting
produced little tangible result. Interrupted by the
attempted putsch in Bujumbura, the summit
resulted in an oral mutual-undertaking to pursue
further consultations on the points that were to be
20 ICG interview, Secretariat General of the United
Nations, New York, 25/02/01, and IRIN Great Lakes
update, No. 1127, 03/03/01.
21 IRIN Great Lakes update No. 1153, 10/04/01, and
ICG telephone interview, member of the facilitation
team, 22/04/01.
22 Ibid.
23 ICG interview, representative of the government of
Burundi, Bujumbura, 24/04/01.
listed in the minutes. Following Pierre Buyoya’s
abrupt return to his capital, the FDD’s spokesman
communicated his satisfaction with the events and
praised Libreville II as ‘a step forward towards
peace and democracy’.24 While denouncing the
manipulation by the head of the state of Burundi,
the FDD also confirmed their availability for future
consultations and requested the official recognition
of President Bongo’s co-mediation, in addition to
that of Vice President Zuma, by the international
community. However, that public satisfaction does
not necessarily mean very much for the peace
process. The FDD in fact maintain that a cease-fire
can only result from the culmination of the
negotiations on the reform of the army, and thus
military operations will continue in Burundi in the
meantime. But violence also serves another
purpose for the FDD. It is an effective way of
offsetting the shortcomings of mercenary forces.
3. Compensating for the shortcomings of
being a mercenary force
In addition to his uncertain relations with the
government of Kinshasa, the leader of the FDD has
had to confront a strong in     ternal challenge since
the middle of the year 2000. The Libreville
meetings strengthened that challenge. After the
battles of Pepa and Pweto, the rout of the FAC and
their allies, followed by the fallback to
Lubumbashi and Zambia, strongly destabilised the
rear bases of the Hutu rebellions in Burundi and
Rwanda. The defeat also greatly weakened the
troops’ morale. Not only did the loss of Pweto
destroy the myth of the Zimbabwean shield, but it
also showed numerous fighters the danger and
futility of their enlistment in the FAC.25 In
consequence, desertions from the CNDD-FDD
units have steadily increased since Fall 2000.26
Several reasons explain the criticism of Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye’s authority from his own ranks.
First, an increasing number of fighters have called
attention to the personal enrichment of both
Ndayikengurukiye and of those close to him, while
24 Jérôme Ndiho, spokesman of the CNDD-FDD,
‘Libreville II is a step forward towards peace and
democracy’, press release No. 189, 20/04/01.
25 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
26 ICG interview, liaison officer with the rebels, Dar-es-
Salaam, 15/10/00, and Bujumbura, 19/02/01.
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the fighters themselves do not even receive enough
from the Congo to improve the everyday lives of
their families in the hills. The Congolese war is not
their war. And yet, they are assuming all the
difficulties. The situation had gone on too long.27
Secondly, certain ‘veteran’ members of the FDD –
well-trained and equipped soldiers having followed
their leader in 1998 and acting as instructors for
the FAC – accuse Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye
of betraying them. In July 2000, Ndayikengurukiye
ordered his young fighters and new recruits to
infiltrate the Burundian armed forces, with a view
to the reform of those armed forces, rather than
moving to the Congo.28 The ‘veterans’, who,
incidentally, only irregularly receive their monthly
pay of USD 120, are thus mainly concerned about
being overlooked by the reform of the army. Old
and worn after years of fighting, they accuse
Ndayikengurukiye of wanting to preposition young
fighters faithful to his authority in the Burundian
armed forces. Those fighters will fill the quota of
50 percent Hutus, indicated in the Arusha accord
for the reform of the armed forces.29
Thirdly, the reorganisation of certain FDD units,
conducted by Laurent Kabila, was considered
unacceptable by some fighters. As of Spring 2000,
the Congolese leader wished to strengthen his
control over the FDD units and transformed many
of them into ‘mixed’ units, consisting of
Burundian, Rwandan, and even Congolese
troops.30 The reorganisation had two objectives:
strengthening the capabilities of the FDD units,
particularly with regard to the handling of heavy
weapons, for which the ex-FAR were better
trained; and duplicating the Burundian command
structure in order to ensure its fidelity. The
reorganisation led to two FDD divisions leaving
for Burundi with weapons and baggage, at the end
of August 2000, without the approval of
Ndayikengurukiye or Laurent Kabila.31
27 ICG interview, liaison officer with the rebels, Dar-es-
Salaam, 14/10/00.
28 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
29 Ibid.
30 ICG telephone interview, member of the facilitation
team, 22/04/01.
31 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01, and liaison officer with the rebels,
Bujumbura, 24/04/01.
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye is also criticised by
his officers and non-commissioned officers. In
particular, he is accused of having eliminated at
least five officers who were either not from his
province, Bururi, or who had graduated from the
prestigious Burundi military academy, ISCAM,
where he himself did not complete his studies.32
His face-to-face meeting with Pierre Buyoya
further strengthened the suspicion that he would
promote a regional agreement, at the expense of
the collective interests of the rebels.33
Given those challenges, the war option for the
CNDD-FDD has the advantage of remobilising the
troops and winning back a little independence from
the Congolese authorities. In addition, Joseph
Kabila appears to want the FDD to leave
Congolese territory. The international community
is subjecting him to pressure for concrete results
with regard to the ‘armed groups’ identified by the
Lusaka accord, and, at the time of disengagement
and deployment of MONUC observers, the
presence of large FDD forces on Congolese
territory is becoming politically inconvenient. The
Congolese President is thus reported to have given
substantial logistic support to the Burundian rebels,
in order for them to return to their 1996 positions
on their own national territory.34 Over the last few
weeks, considerable movements of the FDD
toward Burundi have been confirmed. The FDD
troops are leaving Congolese territory and
returning to Burundi via Tabora in Tanzania, or
directly across Lake Kivu. Between 3000 and 4000
FDD are reported to have returned and attempted
to reoccupy their positions prior to 1996, namely
the Kibira forest, Gicubi and the Bubanza and
Cibitoke mountains.35 The retaking of those
Northern positions, lost after the intensive
resumption of fighting in 1996 following Major
Buyoya’s putsch and the organisation of grouping
camps by the army, will further increase the
security pressure on the Burundian armed forces
and weaken the government in the context of the
negotiations.
32 ICG interview, liaison officer with the rebels, Dar-es-
Salaam, 14/10/00.
33 Ibid.
34 ICG interview, Burundian political observer in regular
contact with the rebels, Bujumbura, 26/04/01.
35 ICG interview, Western diplomats, liaison officer with
the rebels, Burundian political observers, Bujumbura,
22-26/04/01, and IRIN, Great Lakes update No. 1155,
12/04/01.
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By repositioning in Burundi, the FDD leaders
escape the authority of the Congolese officers and
put an end to the accusation of their being
mercenaries. It is not certain, however, that, given
the dissensions in the FDD and its lack of
independence relative to Joseph Kabila, Jean-
Bosco Ndayikengurukiye will totally control the
movement of all his troops. Some units, in
particular those present in the centre and south of
the country, are considered to be recalcitrant to his
authority and to refuse to obey his orders. That
uncertainty, like the indefinite military build-up
before any negotiation, are threats to the peace
process. The facilitation team should respond to
those threats by offering fighters wishing to lay
down their arms an incitement as of now, and by
requiring that the FDD leaders declare a truce in
order for their effective control of the terrain, their
representativeness and their authority to be
checked.36
C. AGATHON RWASA IN POWER,
UNCERTAIN CHANGE IN THE FNL
1. The origin of the overthrow of Cossan
Kabura
The Libreville I meeting between Buyoya and
Ndayikengurukiye also had consequences for the
FNL. The meeting, which conferred on
Ndayikengurukiye the status of exclusive partner
in the negotiations and sole representative of the
rebels, was highly prejudicial to the image of
Cossan Kabura, the head of the FNL, who
remained absent and silent, giving rise to
considerable concern in his movement.37 His chief
of military operations for the Western zone,
Agathon Rwasa, fearing that leaders not from
Bururi would be sidelined, then decided to take
Cossan’s place. Since the breakaway from
PALIPEHUTU-Karatasi38 and the start of the
peace negotiations, doubts had always subsisted as
to the real authority of Cossan Kabura. Silent, or
even absent from the debates, up to the signature of
the Arusha accord, Cossan Kabura was suspected
36 Cf. ICG, ‘The Mandela Effect’, op. cit..
37 ICG interview, member of the political bureau of the
FNL, Bujumbura, 10/01/00.
38 Etienne Karatasi, President of a wing of Palipehutu.
to be mainly concerned with his business dealings
in Tanzania and Congo.39
Moreover, Agathon Rwasa had managed to
establish his own weapon and ammunition supply
lines with the FDD, and Nelson Mandela had
publicly expressed doubts as to Cossan Kabura’s
credibility as leader of the FNL.40 The latter’s
position had become very weak. His replacement
at the head of the FNL, which occurred at the end
of February, is in fact the conclusion of an endless
regional conflict with respect to the leadership of
the rebel movement. Cossan Kabura, from Bururi,
was in fact accused of secretly negotiating with
Bujumbura. Delegations consisting of FRODEBU-
Nzojibwami wing parliamentarians went to Dar-es-
Salaam on three occasions to meet with Kabura
(October 2000, November 2000, February 2001),
and, for the last meeting, came bearing a gift of
over BUF 100 million (about one million US
dollars).41 Cossan Kabura had thus become suspect
in the FNL because of his alleged complicity with
the regime, as evidenced, in particular, by his
refusal to denounce the January Libreville meeting
between the ‘Bururi’ leaders, Buyoya and
Ndayikengurukiye, while the latter was posing as
the only representative of the rebels, but with no
mandate from the other currents in the
movement.42
2. Interpreting the attack on Kinama
After Cossan Kabura's demise, Agathon Rwasa
and his men launched an attack on the Kinama
zone, on the northern periphery of the town of
Bujumbura, and occupied it for two weeks before
being forced to withdraw by the Burundian army.
The surprise attack on Kinama, in which probably
over sixty of the army's soldiers were killed,
39 The press release announcing Cossan Kabura's
destitution is significant in this respect. The press
release criticized Kabura for the fact that no
movement leadership meeting had been held in nine
years, and also accused him of cupidity, illicit
enrichment, nepotism, incompetence, betrayal of the
forces in the field and occultism! Cf. Press release
006/PLPHT-FNL/01, 26/02/01.
40 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
41 ICG interview, member of the partnership institutions,
Bujumbura, 25/04/01.
42 ICG interview, FNL contact, Bujumbura, March 1,
2001.
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greatly damaged the Burundian army’s confidence
in itself and strengthened the position of Agathon
Rwasa.43 The attack was, in fact, designed to
weaken the credibility of Pierre Buyoya as
guarantor of the capital's security and illustrate the
political and military strength of the FNL,
excluded from the Libreville process, and which
now must be taken into account. The attack
enabled Agathon Rwasa to check on the fidelity of
his troops and earn a victor’s reputation among the
Hutu population. The FNL, while suffering heavy
losses, 100 to 200 men, are reported to have been
able to recruit over 1000 men during the
occupation of the traditionally-Hutu quarter of
Bujumbura, both former FDD and FNL members
and new recruits. Despite Cossan Kabura’s
criticisms and announcement of the exclusion of
his rival from the movement in the course of the
extraordinary meeting of the political bureau in
Dar-es-Salaam,44 Agathon Rwasa has thus imposed
himself as the other essential partner in any cease-
fire negotiation, irrespective of whether it is held in
Libreville or in South Africa.
Does the attack on Kinama and Agathon Rwasa’s
arrival at the head of the movement constitute a
new tactical departure for the FNL? Foreign and
national Burundian political observers agree that,
since Kinama, the rebel movement is taking less
and less civilian lives.45 In addition, their
commitment to evacuating civilians and preventing
pillaging by restricting access to abandoned
houses, and their show of strength against the
Burundian armed forces, have greatly contributed
to making the FNL a more credible political force.
In any case, it reflects a desire to change their
image of ‘genocidal attackers’.46 Agathon Rwasa is
also considered to have a more political view of
the conflict than Cossan Kabura, and thus to want
to spare civilians, with a view to transforming the
movement into a non-armed political force, once
43 ICG interview, Burundian political observers and
Western diplomats, Bujumbura, 22-26/04/01.
44 Fondation Hirondelle, ‘Cossan Kabura states that he is
still the commander PALIPEHUTU-FNL’, 04/03/01.
45 Cf. RFI Bulletin, 24/04/01, and ICG interviews,
Western diplomats and Burundian political observers,
22-27/04/01.
46 ICG telephone interview, member of the FNL, March
18, 2001, and ICG interview, Burundian political
observer in contact with the rebels, Bujumbura,
26/04/01.
the negotiations have been concluded.47 In
addition, the visit to South Africa of
representatives of the FNL’s new leadership and
their meeting with Vice President Zuma have been
welcomed as a constructive development by the
South African facilitators, even though the rebels
only restated the conditions that they want fulfilled
by the government prior to their real entry into the
peace process.48
Explaining the obvious change in attitude of
Agathon Rwasa’s FNL is difficult. The same
troops have implemented terrorist operations, such
as shooting up a Sabena airliner landing at
Bujumbura, a bloody attack on the bus, Titanic,
connecting Kigali to the capital of Burundi in
December 2000, and numerous other massacres of
civilians over the last few years, when they were,
in fact, under the order of the same Agathon
Rwasa.49 It is probable that purely economic, and,
hence, temporary, reasons explain the recent
decrease in the number of the FNL’s victims. The
movement’s association with the FDD has enabled
it to considerably increase its stock of arms and
ammunitions, obtain uniforms, and even procure
financial support. This would explain why the
fighters now spare civilians much more. They have
much less need to steal and pillage in order to eat
and now obtain the resources necessary for their
47 ICG interview, Western diplomat, Bujumbura,
25/04/01.
48 The preconditions, reconfirmed by the new
spokesman of the FNL on Radio Bonesha during the
Kinama attack, are as follows: 1) dismantlement of all
the concentration camps holding Hutus or Tutsis; 2)
return of the government soldiers to their barracks; 3)
official recognition of the FNL in order for them to
work in the open, like all the other political parties; 4)
dismantlement of all the government’s militias; 5) an
end to summary judgments by criminal courts; 6)
unconditional release of all political prisoners. Cf.
SAPA Bulletin, 29/03/01, PANA Bulletin, 30/03/01,
and Radio Bonesha, Interview of Anicet
Ntawuhinaganyo, FNL spokesman, Bujumbura,
06/03/01.
49 Some foreign sources have indicated that the FNL
political cadres underwent technical guerilla training
with Chinese or North-Korean instructors in Congo,
under the sponsorship of Laurent-Désiré Kabila,
during the year 2000, but the movement’s spokesman
categorically denies the information, which has not
been confirmed by any other source in Bujumbura.
ICG interviews, Bujumbura, 21-27/04/01.
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supplies in neighbouring Congo.50 Kinama is
therefore much more a symbol of the tactical
alliance between the FNL and FDD – and the
arrival, at the head of the movement, of Agathon
Rwasa, the incarnation of that alliance – than a real
change in political vision. Moreover, the FNL
would have had much more difficulty holding the
quarter of Bujumbura for two weeks if the FDD
had not simultaneously attacked the Burundian
army’s position in five provinces.51 In
consequence, a large number of the Burundian
units deployed in Congo had to return urgently to
Burundi.
3. The alliance of the ex-FAR and FDD: a
poorly-calculated risk
The presence of armed members of the Rwandan
Hutu opposition in Burundi and the association of
the PALIPEHUTU rebels with the FAR have long
been established. Most of the rebels are former
refugees, who began living in Rwanda under
Juvénal Habyarimana and are reputed to speak
kirundi with a Rwandan accent and sing songs in
kinyarwanda during their attacks. Certain
PALIPEHUTU militants are reported to have even
actively supported the FAR in its war against FPR
from 1990, taking part in the genocide in 1994 and
contributing to sowing terror through the Hutu
refugee camps in the Congo in 1994-1995. Gaston
Karekezi, a former FAR captain, is reported to
have been operating in Burundi for three years.52 In
addition to former Burundian PALIPEHUTU
militants having lived much of their lives in
Rwanda, the FNL also include a certain number of
Rwandan members in their units.
However, the relationship between the ex-FAR and
Burundian FNL remains characterised by strategic
and leadership quarrels. In February 2000, the FNL
underwent a deadly internal purge. Agathon Rwasa
and his men are considered to have eliminated over
one hundred ex-FAR members incorporated into
the FNL, who refused the former's authority and
were suspected of wanting to discontinue the
50 ICG interview, liaison officer with the rebels and
Burundian political observer in contact with the
rebels, Bujumbura, 26/04/01.
51 AFP, ‘The army and rebels are fighting in five
provinces’, 07/03/01.
52 ICG interview, member of the military intelligence
departments, Bujumbura, 02/03/01.
struggle.53 Again, one week before the Kinama
operation, Agathon's troops are reported to have
confronted the ex-FAR, allied to Cossan Kabura,
and to have killed 12 to 18 of their officers.54 The
physical elimination or serious wounding of the
Burundian leader was announced by many.55
The association of the FNL with the ex-FAR
nonetheless casts doubt on the nature of the
movement, its structure and its intentions. After
both the purge in February 2000 and the recent
combats, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe under the
orders of Agathon Rwasa are no longer very
numerous. It is probable that many of them still
work with Nestor Nizigama, Cossan Kabura's chief
of staff, and are still incorporated into one or
another of the FNL movement's units. Through
their association with the Rwandan forces, the
Burundian rebels give preference to an ethnic
interpretation of the struggle, which is not only
likely to make them lose the little international
legitimacy that they have, but also to permanently
ruin the scope for dialogue and negotiation with a
view to re-incorporation in the Burundian army.
The split of the FNL from the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe is now unavoidable if the FNL wish
to be fully accepted in the Burundi peace process,
but there is no sign, at the current time, that they
are ready to make that move.
The alliance with the FDD does not provide any
additional assurances that a cease-fire will be
rapidly obtained. The alliance, however, has
several advantages for the FNL. In addition to
strengthening the co-ordination of military
operations and constituting a united rebel front to
weaken the Burundian army in the field, the
alliance enables the rebels to move beyond the
problems posed by regionalism. Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye has thus begun to move closer
to Agathon Rwasa, who is from Ngozi (in the
North), in order to overcome the regional
cleavages which undermine his movement, and
53 Cf. ICG, 'The Mandela Effect', op. cit.. Human Rights
Watch, 'Brutal Burundian war draws in Rwandan
combatants', Press release, 23/03/00, and Human
Rights Watch, 'Neglecting Justice in Making Peace',
Burundi Report, 23/03/00.
54 ICG interview, member of the facilitation team,
Nairobi,28/03/01.
55 ICG interviews, liaison officer with the rebels,
Bujumbura, 19/02/01, and Western diplomats,
Arusha, 26/02/01.
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counter the suspicion of a secrete agreement with
the other belligerents form Bururi. Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye is even reported to have
requested the replacement of Cossan Kabura (also
from Bururi) at the head of the Palipehutu-FNL
before accepting a potential alliance between the
two groups, as was wished and encouraged by the
Hutu political circles in the interior and in the
Diaspora.56 In return, Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye is reported to have given
assurances that his officers would continue to be
drawn from several regions, in particular, by
replacing his head of southern operations, Prime
Ngendakumana, from Muramvya province,
recently wounded in Makamba, by commander
Evariste, another fighter from Muramvya.
The contacts between the political branches and
heads of staff of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye's
FDD and Agathon Rwasa's FNL are now regular.
In addition to a meeting between the political
leaders of the movements in Mayotte, at the end of
March, Agathon Rwasa also went to Lubumbashi
during the same period for an FDD congress in
order to consecrate the alliance between the two
rebel movements. The FDD supply the FNL with
uniforms, ammunitions and arms (via Lake Kivu),
provide active support (if required), and exchange
intelligence on the positions and movements of the
Burundian army.57 In that context, in addition to
the even greater risk (for the FNL) of
fragmentation and lack of representativeness of the
leadership involved in the peace talks, the tactic of
strengthening positions before any negotiation is
also fully operative and the prospects for a cease-
fire remain very remote
The Burundian government is no stranger to the
same game, since it has also considerably
increased its stocks of heavy weapons, in the
expectation of imminent and joint attacks,
comparable to that on Kinama, by the FNL and
FDD. Heavy weapons, such as 'Stalin's organs', are
the only guarantee that the Burundian government
can prevent the rebels permanently occupying part
of the country's territory. The army has thus
procured additional artillery since the attack on
Kinama, so as not to have to move the artillery
56 ICG interview, member of the mediation team,
Nairobi, 28/03/01.
57 ICG interview, Burundian political observer in contact
with the rebels, Bujumbura, 27/04/01.
around during the fighting and in order to be able
to respond to any eventuality, concomitantly,
throughout the country.58
In addition, time is not on the side of the rebels.
The explicit statement in Security Council
resolution No. 1341, in February 2001 on the issue
of disarming the armed groups and Joseph Kabila's
subsequent commitment to a resolution of the
issue, are not in favour of the FDD, which runs the
risk, in the intermediate to long term, of being
considered 'negative forces' to be subjected to a
neutralisation and disarmament plan in the DRC.
The Burundian government has thus every interest
in procrastinating, resisting militarily, and awaiting
the time when the rebellion will have lost its
political credit and military power (something
which the rebels will probably have much more
difficulty maintaining without the active support of
Kinshasa). Ultimately, such a scenario would be
prejudicial to the negotiations, since it would be
likely to induce a gradual breakdown of the
rebellion (i.e. reduced militarily but still difficult to
pin down), together with maintenance of
continuous violence and insecurity in the hills of
rural Bujumbura.
Lastly, the rebel strategy, for both the FDD and for
the FNL, is undoubtedly a zero-sum game in which
everybody loses: the rebels and the people of
Burundi. The Burundian rebels must become
aware that it is high time for them to give concrete
signs of their desire to rejoin the peace process. If
they do not do so, they may lose the opportunity
for equitable negotiation. It is therefore urgent for
the facilitators to change their strategy with the
rebels by requiring a truce as a demonstration of
their representativeness and support for the peace
process, while offering a context for the reception,
recording and support of combatants who wish to
lay down their arms. The rebels who want to join
the peace process must be able to do so. In the
absence of a concrete undertaking of that type by
the FNL and FDD, their status as 'negative forces',
a label comparable to that given by the Lusaka
accord, is inevitable. Conversely, the government
must also give pledges of its good faith and
commitment to negotiating reform of the security
forces, by proposing right away a plan to reduce
and reorganise the armed forces. The soldiers of
58 ICG interview, Burundian political observer, close to
the army, Bujumbura, 27/04/01.
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the army of Burundi must be able to understand
that the reform does not mean they are being
thrown out into the street, but instead, given a real
chance of beginning a second life that will be
much more satisfactory than the first. The
humanitarian catastrophe in Burundi is too
immense for the rebellion and the government to
enter into an interminable cycle of fighting and
negotiating.
D. THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE
The social and human cost of the civil war in
Burundi is dramatic. In a little less than ten years
of insurrection, all the indicators of the human
development of Burundi's population have
regressed, in some cases taking the country back
twenty years. Life expectancy at birth, which was
44 years in 1970, had increased by almost ten years
in 1992, but subsequently dropped to 42 years in
1997. In ten years, the infant mortality rate has
risen to its 1970 level. There are now almost 136
deaths per thousand births. Primary school was
attended by 52 percent of children of the
appropriate age in 1992. Attendance fell to 37
percent in 1998/1999. The per capita GNP, which
was USD 240 in 1980, had fallen, almost by half,
to USD 134 in 1997. In 1998, 60 percent of the
rural population and 67 percent of the urban
population was living below the poverty level,
compared to 25 and 33 percent, respectively, in
1992.59
In February 2001, a total of 390,000 people from
Burundi were registered as refugees by the
UNHCR, of whom 370,000 were in Tanzania
alone. During the same period, over 380,000
Burundians were displaced inside the country in
210 reported sites. Over 120,000 displaced
persons, initially living in the camps, have not
returned to those sites or their homes since July
2000, making the total number of displaced people
about 500,000.60
This situation was already catastrophic.
Intensification of the fighting in the first quarter of
2001 gave rise to the emergence of a hitherto
59 UNOCHA, 'Background note on Burundi for the
executive Committee on humanitarian affairs',
mimeograph, Nairobi, 04/04/01.
60 Ibid.
unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Due to the
breakdown of the agricultural distribution
networks, the absence of stocks due to two
successive droughts since 1998, and the general
fall in production related to population
displacement and weakness, a famine occurred in
the north-eastern provinces of the country,
inducing the migration of 85,000 children to the
nutrition centres. In parallel, since the end of
October 2000, population migrations have induced
the progression of a malaria epidemic from the low
lands towards the high lands, resulting in
contamination of previously spared communities,
who are devoid of immune defences. The Office
for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs of
the United Nations (OCHA) estimates that over
three million people in Burundi, i.e. half of the
country's population, now suffer from malaria.
Lastly, each new offensive brings supplementary
victims. The rebels' attack on Kinama in February
and March 2001 resulted in displacement of over
54,000 people, forced to leave their homes in the
most abject poverty. Only three-quarters of those
displaced had returned to Kinama in early April.
5,500 families refused to return, fearing for their
lives, while over 350 houses were destroyed,
damaged or pillaged.
In response to the multiple crises, the Burundian
Ministry of Human Rights signed a framework
agreement with OCHA on February 7. The
agreement is intended to facilitate the relations
between the government and the humanitarian
community, with regard to access to displaced
persons and the provision of the necessary aid. In
parallel, OCHA has resolved to attempt to reopen
discussions with the rebels, as it did at the end of
1999, under the mediation of the Centre Henri
Dunant, with the aim of facilitating access to
displaced persons and eliciting compliance with
international humanitarian law.61
However, given the escalation of violence and the
total disillusionment of a population at the mercy
of the belligerents, it is to be feared that such
efforts will not be sufficient to restore hope or
counter the facile tribal discourse. An increasingly
impoverished, weakened and deprived population
is the ideal breeding-ground for ethnic chauvinism,
61 ICG interview, UNOCHA official, Nairobi, 11/04/01.
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in the absence of dividends from the peace process.
An urgent change in the framework of the
negotiation is necessary, so that the negotiations
may be completed and in order for transition to
become possible.
II. AN IMPOSSIBLE TRANSITION IN THE
CURRENT SITUATION
Following the attack on Kinama, Pierre Buyoya
and the Burundian armed forces decided to
counterattack politically and harden their positions
with respect to application of the Arusha accord. A
cease-fire thus became an absolute imperative, in
order to begin setting up the transitional
institutions.62 Conscious of the need to make the
spirit of peace live, the government did not,
however, block the application of all the protocols.
According to the government, in the absence of a
cease-fire, implementation of Protocol II (on the
transitional institutions) is impossible and would
even require renegotiating between the
signatories.63 But other results of the peace accord,
derived, in particular, from protocols I and IV, are
applicable. The council of ministers thus decided,
at the end April, to prepare the bills for the creation
of a national commission to study the conditions
for the return of refugees and displaced persons.64
At the end of March, the Accord implementation
and monitoring committee was also briefed in
order for an internal technical committee,
responsible for studying the political prisoner
issue, to be set up. Again as a sign of change, a
governmental institution for the defence and
protection of human rights, whose creation was
decided the previous year, was also launched at the
end of April.65
Given that double language, the G6 parties
(coalition of 6 parties defending the Tutsis'
interests as a priority) and the G7 parties (coalition
of seven parties defending the Hutus' interests)
were quick to denounce manipulation of the
62 ' I would like to say here, forcefully, that the
government, given the situation developing in the
field, will require of the signatories, mediator and
region that the set-up of the institutions be real at the
time that a cease-fire takes place. Neither the
facilitator, nor the region can require a change in
institutions before the cessation of hostilities',
specified President Buyoya during a press conference
on 05/03/01.
63 Cf. the first Vice President's responses to a
parliamentary question sessioin, PANA Bulletin,
28/04/01, and AFP, 'The government asks the
signatories to review the peace accord', 28/04/01.
64 Azania Bulletin, 26/04/01.
65 Iteka Bulletin, 26/04/01.
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security pretext, enabling Buyoya to hold on to
power, although the majority of the Arusha accord
signatories had rejected his candidature. The
parties confirmed their support for Colonel
Bayaganakandi as an alternative representative of
the Tutsis' interests. Given that apparently
irreconcilable opposition, which was to trigger the
end of direct negotiations between UPRONA and
FRODEBU on the conditions for set-up of the
transitional institutions at the end of January, the
South-African facilitators were incapable of
deciding or negotiating a veritable alternative
solution. They therefore made use of an easy
solution, namely separating the transition period
into two sub-periods, which in no way changes the
basic problem. While the Implementation and
Monitoring Committee, which has next to nothing
to implement or monitor, has already been shown
to be expensive and ineffective, the attempted coup
on April 18 highlighted the risk of the peace
process totally collapsing if a rapid means of
breaking the deadlock is not found.
A. THE ATTEMPTED PUTSCH ON APRIL 18,
AN ALARM SIGNAL
1. Putsch or farce?66
At about 2 p.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 2001,
Lieutenant Pasteur-Gaston Ntakarutimana left his
post with his unit of some forty soldiers to march
to highway RN9, where three civilian trucks were
awaiting him. A single truck was sufficient to
transport the small group of soldiers from the
Gakumbu barracks, for the protection of the
airport, to the buildings of the Burundian national
radio and television station (RTNB), in the centre
of the capital. When the truck arrived in front of
the main entrance of the RTNB, at about 3.30 p.m.,
two bursts fired into the air were sufficient to scare
the guards. The unit of red berets, usually heavily
armed and equipped with an armoured personnel
carrier, who were supposed to protect the RTNB,
66 Cf. AFP, 'Confused situation in Bujumbura after an
attempted coup', 18/04/01; AFP, 'The army put down
an attempted putsch in Burundi without violence',
19/04/01; AFP, ''All the mutineers surrendered after
the putsch attempt', 19/04/01; Iteka Bulletin, 'Failed
coup in Burundi', 19/04/01; Iteka Bulletin, 25/04/01;
ICG interviews, members of the security forces and
Burundian political observers, Bujumbura, 22-
27/04/01.
did not react. Lieutenant Ntakarutimana's unit thus
entered the RTNB building without difficulty and
took over broadcasting. The following message
was broadcasted every twenty minutes:
'Men and women of Burundi,
You are all aware of the harm that the rebellion has
done to the people of Burundi. The bands of killers
massacre children, the elderly and women. You
also know that those who support the genocide are
in the government, in the national assembly and in
other institutions of the country. Can you imagine
that those people are more interested in their jobs
in Arusha than in the people, who they leave to
suffer hunger and misery?
You know that the government is doing nothing to
restart the economy of this country in distress.
Considering the murderous achievements of this
government,
Considering the meetings with the rebels behind
the back of Burundian patriots, the following
measures have been taken in the people's interest.
Article one: Pierre Buyoya and his government are
hereby relieved of their responsibilities.
Article two: the national assembly, consisting
mainly of the perpetrators of genocide and others
appointed by Buyoya, is hereby suspended.
Article three: all the frontiers are hereby closed.
Article four: it is forbidden to go out from 8 p.m.
in the evening to 5 a.m. in the morning.
Article five: the FJP national council (Patriotic
Youth Front), directed by Lieutenant
Ntakarutimana, is hereby created.
Article six: all assemblies are hereby prohibited.
All of the above provisions have been taken in the
interest of the people of Burundi and the foreigners
living in our country. We ask everyone to support
us. The people of Burundi are authorised to
demonstrate to support our salutary action in a
calm manner.
The security forces are requested to make the
greatest efforts everywhere they are, so that the
enemy does not escape. We ask the same of all the
people of Burundi. We do not refuse the Arusha
peace talks, but we reject our representatives. The
FJP will inform you of our valid representatives in
the near future.
THANK YOU.'
In the minutes that followed the broadcasting of
the message, the loyalist security services were
warned of the attempted coup. While awaiting the
army, the gendarmes assumed positions, at about
4.30 p.m., to control the access to the RTNB.
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Lieutenant Ntakarutimana was nonetheless able to
withdraw from the building, armed and
accompanied by two bodyguards. He went to the
café, 'Chez La Reine', and took a civilian van to
drive to the Higher Institute of Military Cadre
(ISCAM). He entered the premises of ISCAM
without difficulty and left with four officer cadets
– his accomplices – whom he brought back to the
RTNB to help control the building. The RTNB's
transmitter was disconnected at about 6.15 p.m.
Towards 6.30 p.m., the 12th parachute regiment
surrounded the RTNB, on the orders of the
Minister of National Defence, Colonel Cyrille
Nkurukiye. The town remained calm. No panic
was observed in the population. The parachutists
shut down the official buildings and told the civil
servants to go home. In town, nothing was moving.
The loyalist units occupied the strategic points of
the capital, one after the other, and told the public
institution employees to go home. Celebrations
were already beginning in the Tutsi quarters of
Bujumbura, while the fear of reprisals and
repression led a number of Hutu dignitaries to flee
towards the Congolese frontier.
Inside the RTNB, Lieutenant Ntakarutimana called
his accomplices to find out how the situation was
progressing in their areas. At the same time,
informed of the attempted putsch, over 200
ISCAM officers attempted to rejoin the RTNB, but
were stopped by the parachutists and retreated to a
neighbouring wood. They were brought back to
their camp around 4.00 a.m., after negotiations
with their line of command. As of 7.00 p.m., the
Minister of Defence assured himself that the
situation was fully under control and broadcast an
appeal for calm on an independent radio station.
He began negotiating the surrender of the
mutineers, who gradually began leaving the RTNB
buildings. Around 20 minutes past midnight, all
the mutineers had surrendered and Lieutenant
Ntakarutimana had been detained. The putsch had
failed. Pierre Buyoya, who had left to meet with
the FDD at Libreville, returned to Bujumbura the
next morning. A commission of inquiry was set up
by the District Attorney, on April 20, to investigate
the affair. In the following days, two presumed
accomplices of the putschists, Ildephonse
Ndagijimana, a trade-union activist with
ONATEL, and Raphaël Manirakiza, PARENA
supporters, were arrested. The first was to have cut
the telephone lines on the day of the putsch, but
did not succeed. The second, a friend of the
mutinous lieutenant, had already been sought by
the security services in 1997, during the 'war of the
mines' in Bujumbura. Colonel Buhungu, a former
governor of Ngozi and faithful supporter of Jean-
Baptiste Bagaza, at whose home the meetings to
prepare the putsch were held, is reported to be on
the run. On April 25, in addition to the 52
mutineers, 72 soldiers, who were supposed to
guard the RTNB, and nine other ISCAM officer
cadets were arrested. Three days earlier,
PARENA's spokesman announced that 'we morally
support Lieutenant Pasteur Ntakarutimana because
he is defending our ideas', and PARENA 'morally
supports the person who can overthrow Major
Buyoya'.67 The other political parties simply
expressed their surprise with regard to the lack of
preparation and rigour of the mutineers, most
suggesting that Pierre Buyoya was probably
responsible for a sham attempted coup against
himself.
2. Interpretations and consequences
It is impossible to assign the responsibility for the
attempted putsch with any certainty. The putsch,
which has many of the aspects of farce, suggests
obvious complicities, both at military staff level
and among PARENA sympathisers, but it is
difficult to say whether those complicities were
real, whether they were intended to test the
reaction of certain sectors of the army, or whether
the mutineers were in fact manipulated by one or
another of the power centres in the country,
including the president's office. The ease with
which the mutineers entered the RTNB, entered
and left the ISCAM, and how they went about their
business with no immediate reaction from the
military authorities of the capital, is, to say the
least, surprising. It shows either a degree of laxity
in the security forces, which is unlikely just six
weeks after the Kinama attack, or complicity with
persons who were not brave enough to fully carry
out their operation, or a large-scale attempt at
manipulation, carefully organised so as to
minimise the scope for slip-ups. The prudence of
Pierre Buyoya's reaction, despite the seriousness of
the facts, is also to be noted. The set-up of a
commission of inquiry, given twenty days to
formulate its conclusions, is a provision that would
appear to be, at the least, a very slow and litigious
67 AFP, 'PARENA 'morally' supports the author of the
attempted putsch on April 18', 22/04/01.
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manner of shedding light on an attempted putsch
intended to depose the President.
However, none of the foregoing provides sufficient
evidence in support of the hypothesis of a major
presidential manipulation intended to strengthen
the sympathy of the region, the facilitators or the
international community with regard to Pierre
Buyoya, or the existence of a true plot fomented by
'Tutsi extremists', PARENA sympathisers. The
declaration of support for the putschists, after the
event, by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, in itself, means
nothing, but a reconfirmation of the president of
PARENA's distrust with respect to the Arusha
process. Following the arrest of his supporters, it
would have been inexpedient for the former
President to withhold his moral support and to not
attempt to embrace the spirit of the Tutsi cause, a
bone of contention with Pierre Buyoya, in order to
preside over the transitional period.
The attempted putsch on 18 April 2001 above all
illustrates the state of confusion of, in particular,
the armed forces, and the Tutsi community, in
general. It in fact vindicates Pierre Buyoya's
partisans as much as his adversaries. The exposure
of the acute divisions within the army and the
celebrations which greeted the putsch in certain
Tutsi quarters of Bujumbura68 show the extent to
which President Buyoya has become unpopular
within his own community, irrespective of his
attempts to legitimise his position. The President's
room to move would seem so narrow that he
cannot even strike firmly against the accomplices
of the putsch, or even the ISCAM cadets, among
whom are many sons of good families with close
links to Bururi's superior officers. Pierre Buyoya
no longer has a firm hold on power. He is
doubtless at risk of being overthrown and
eliminated by those who brought him to power or
by the opposition in the armed forces. This
catastrophic scenario would undoubtedly provoke
an explosion of violence in the capital, the paying-
off of scores between political leaders, and 'ethnic
purification' operations. The negotiated departure
of Pierre Buyoya, in the short term, is thus
essential in order to save the peace process. In
contrast, the total control of the situation by
loyalist forces has undoubtedly strengthened his
credibility as the interface for cease-fire
68 ICG interview, Burundian political observer,
Bujumbura, 23/04/01.
negotiations. Pierre Buyoya is no longer the
uncontested chief of the Burundian armed forces,
but remains the main representative of those
forces. Even though PARENA is doubtless the
ideal scapegoat for an attempted putsch and even
though Lieutenant Ntakarutimana's anti-party and
anti-FRODEBU declarations lend undue credence
to Pierre Buyoya's moderate profile, the risk of
assassination of the President by those who
brought him to power – an obviously catastrophic
scenario – is to be taken seriously. As a result, a
solution to the transition question must be urgently
found, since none of the alternatives proposed by
the Burundian parties is associated with any
assurance of faithful implementation of the peace
accord.
B. THE BUYOYA-BAMVUGINYUMVIRA
OPTION: DANGEROUS MAINTENANCE OF
THE STATUS QUO
Faced with the inability of the political parties to
achieve a consensus on the question of the
leadership of the transitional period, Nelson
Mandela and regional heads of state recommended,
on February 26, 2001, in Arusha, that the
transitional period be divided into two sub-periods
of eighteen months each, alternately managed by a
Tutsi President and a Hutu Vice President, then
vice-versa, with the Hutu Vice President of the
first period becoming the President of the second.
That idea, finally accepted by the signatories, had
been defended by Nelson Mandela since July 2000.
UPRONA fell into line, while FRODEBU was
consistently opposed, denouncing the head of
state's cease-fire blackmail and stressing the need
to re-establish the political legitimacy derived from
the 1993 election for the transitional period. The
ethnic arithmetic, whether elicited for reform of the
army, or for the partition of the transitional period,
does not provide any assurances for the peace
process. As long as those who hold the real power
have not been deprived of it, any attempt at
application of the accord will amount to no more
than a betrayal of the spirit of Arusha. Moreover,
in that context, the ethnic arithmetic does not
afford a response to the thorny question of the
transitional leadership.
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1. Bururi: power or nothing
Although the war is materially preventing the
implementation of the various Arusha accord
protocols, the government’s rejection of the set-up
of transitional institutions, under the pretext of an
absence of a cease-fire, is still not credible. The
government's tactical management of the peace
negotiations tends to prove that the status quo suits
it well. The government's only concern is
protecting its privileges and the impunity of the
Bururi's political-military oligarchy, which
returned to power in 1996 after President Buyoya's
second putsch.69 As the ICG has clearly shown in
Report No. 25, entitled 'Neither War nor Peace',
Pierre Buyoya's government has so far given no
tangible sign of its strong commitment to moving
Burundi toward a new system of governance that
will enable an end to war. Confiding the
transitional period to the government, with no
assurances with respect to its departure and global
and impartial implementation of the accord, would
be equivalent to a dangerous pursuit of the status
quo. The attempted putsch on April 18 shows the
extent to which that has become dangerous.
Like Pasteur-Gaston Ntakarutimana, who seized
the buildings of the Burundian national radio and
television station in the afternoon of April 18,
2000, in order to overthrow the government,
numerous officers of the Burundian armed forces
complain of the excessively political management
of the conflict by Buyoya, who appears to wish to
sustain it, rather than find a durable solution,
irrespective of whether that solution is political or
military.
Dissatisfaction is also widespread among many of
the army's cadres, who do not come from Bururi.
They have the feeling that they are being used as
cannon fodder for the sole benefit of the superior
officers from Bururi, who are busy making the
most of their Congolese business dealings or
sharing out the few public contracts still allocated
by the state. Non-commissioned officers from
69 Cf. the lists of the bosses of state-controlled corporations
and the regional administrative leaders, published by
FRODEBU's newspaper, 'La Lumière', and appended.
The lists are not exhaustive and doubtless over-
represent the presence of individuals from Bururi in
the state structures. The lists nonetheless give a
significant indication of the extent of Bururi's 'return
to business' after the 1996 putsch.
Muramvya, Ngozi, Mwaro and Gitega are being
asked to fight, without really being given the
necessary resources, both to prevent an excessive
number of victims among the Hutu civilian
population and thus international indignation, and
because maintaining a low-level conflict is
politically advantageous for the regime. However,
with the increase in the rebel's firepower, the
situation is becoming unsustainable. The officers
sent to fight are incurring increasingly heavy
losses. As a result, they are increasingly critical of
the political power which pretends to defend their
interests, but in fact secretly negotiates with the
enemy, while working toward their ultimate
demobilisation, or 'throwing them out into the
street' to replace them by 'genocidal' rebels, in the
context of the reform of the armed forces.70
In brief, the general staff of the Burundian armed
forces, among whom officers from Bururi
predominate, is suspected, by the non-
commissioned officers, of complacency with the
status quo and of not doing anything, politically or
militarily, to stop the war. Such disillusionment
affects the discipline of the troops, who, while not
necessarily ready to mutiny, frequently attempt to
avoid combat by, for instance, managing not to
receive their orders. But for the time being, as
shown by the little support for Lieutenant
Ntakuratimana in his attempted coup, the majority
of the officers remain legitimist, resigned to the
status quo. For both the military high command
and the armed forces cadres, Pierre Buyoya
remains, by default, the only acceptable leader for
the transitional period. But a breach has been
opened, and both the discontented non-
commissioned officers and the Bururi political-
military oligarchy could change their minds, as is
also shown by the probable complicity with the
apprentice putschists on April 18, 2001.
The political-military system of the South fears
being forced into a premature political retreat, in
which the protection and misappropriation of funds
from which they benefit may be called into
question. Impartial implementation of the peace
accord means, by definition, the end of impunity,
state monopolies and, for some people, appearance
in court. However, the rejection of the candidate,
Epitace Bayaganakandi, by an important fringe of
70 ICG interview, officer of the Burundian armed forces,
Bujumbura, 08/02/01.
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the Burundian army's high command, which
includes a number of 'suspected putschists', and by
the cadres, still appears unanimous. This is
explained, in part, by the fact that, early in the
negotiations with the leaders of FRODEBU,
Epitace Bayaganakandi is reported to have agreed
to leave them the presidency and to make do with
the position of Vice President during the
transitional period. In addition, certain army
officers from Bururi blame Epitace Bayaganakandi
for his flight to the French embassy on the day
after the attempted putsch and assassination of
President Melchior Ndadaye, in October 1993. For
the army, the foregoing constitute unpardonable
original sins.71 Lastly, Colonel Epitace
Bayaganakandi, who is from Muramvya, is too
close to his congeners, who wish to replace the
Bururi oligarchy, to be able to provide any
protection for the others.72
Accordingly, as long as Pierre Buyoya manages to
protect the interests of the Bururi's establishment,
and Tutsi soldiers in general, his wished or
supposed replacement by his own people would be
counterproductive. Buyoya has not yet totally lost
his image as a moderate appealing to the
international community and the success of his
political manoeuvring has demonstrated his skills
as a defender of Bururi's interests at the head of
state. In his face-to-face meeting with Jean Minani,
then his signature of the peace accord with
reservations, and his visit to Libreville, Pierre
Buyoya has always retained the political initiative
vis-à-vis his adversaries. Buyoya and his men also
know how to exploit a double discourse and appeal
to their troops. At each of their tours through the
country's military barracks and at each meeting
with the governors of the provinces or ISCAM
young officers, they actively reassure the Tutsi
community, indicating that, under no
circumstances, will the Arusha accord be
implemented, or the reform of the army or judicial
system be initiated.73 In addition, a sufficient
number of institutional and political mechanisms
have been provided for that purpose,74 and the
71 ICG interview, officer of the Burundian army,
Bujumbura, 07/01/01.
72 ICG interview, Burundian political observer,
Bujumbura, 23/04/01.
73 ICG communication, member of the partnership
institutions, Bujumbura, 19/02/01.
74 Cf. ICG, 'Burundi: Neither War nor Peace', op. cit..
army is already actively recruiting Hutu soldiers so
as to be able to accept only a minimum of rebels,
who will be carefully vetted.75
In fact, Pierre Buyoya and the Bururi oligarchy are
still solidly anchored in power, and no resolution
taken in Arusha can displace them. In parallel,
although the attempted putsch weakened the head
of state, he rightly considers that he has not been
politically or militarily divested of his authority.
Thus, the threat of rejecting all negotiations with
the political parties despite the signature of the
Arusha accord, and to focus on negotiations
between the belligerents in Libreville, has been put
on the table by the government.76
In fact, the absence of a cease-fire, maintenance of
fear, and the spectre of a general mobilisation, or
even declaration of a state of emergency, have
become the government's favourite strategy in
order to oppose the set-up of a transitional
executive and attempt to restore the unity of the
Tutsi community around the government. The
declaration of a state of emergency is now
presented as an eventuality that cannot be
excluded, and the Tutsi population has been asked
to mobilise massively when the time comes: 'the
citizens must be ready for any eventuality and a
vast program of civic training and civilian self-
defence is being prepared by the accredited
technical services … vigilance is still required, and
we must be ready for any eventuality'.77 The set-
up, at the end of March, of a national Security
Council, intended to strengthen and better co-
ordinate security operations in the country, is to be
viewed in the same light.78
75 ICG communication, member of the partnership
institutions, Bujumbura, 19/02/01, and Burundi office,
Briefing paper No. 813, Bujumbura/Bonn, 22/12/00.
76 ICG interview, Burundian armed forces officer,
Bujumbura, 18/02/01.
77 Message of the town's maire, on the national radio
station, and repeated in an Iteka news bulletin,
06/03/01.
78 The national security council was created by
presidential decree on 22/03/01, and met for the first
time on 04/04/01. Chaired by the head of state, the
council consists of the two Vice Presidents and the
following ministers: external relations, interior,
judiciary, national defense, agriculture, peace process,
the governor of Kirundo, and the attorney general. Cf.
RTNB Bulletin, 04/04/01.
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2. The recycling of the Partnership
Agreement
Conscious of the need to retain the political
initiative and to at least partially apply the peace
accord to obtain the U.S.$ 440 million pledged by
the international community at the Paris
Conference in December 2000, UPRONA and the
government argue in favour of a partial application
of the accord, which would enable them to pursue
the war against the rebels. The President's advisors
are, in fact, convinced that the current unpopularity
of the head of state is only temporary and mainly
due to the dramatic degradation in the country's
economic and humanitarian situation. A massive
influx of international aid would no doubt enable
the situation to be reversed.79
UPRONA and the government also argue that, to
prevent an institutional guerrilla war of the
'government convention' type, it is indispensable
for the parties to negotiate a transitional
constitution to overcome the deficiencies of the
peace accord and clarify the relationships, power
sharing, and everyday operations of the transitional
institutions. In doing so, the government is also
playing for time, with a view to breaking the
political parties' rejection front, allowing Libreville
to progress, and imposing Pierre Buyoya as the
only leader able to negotiate a cease-fire, and
hence manage the first half of the transitional
period.80 The negotiations for a transitional
constitution would also enable UPRONA to offer
tempting transitional positions to the members of
the G6 resistance and form a 'broader partnership'
open to a majority of the political parties.
Pierre Buyoya uses both carrots and sticks. He did
not hesitate to adopt a more aggressive stance on
the eve of the summit on February 26, and
brandish the threat of 'appropriately' punishing all
those who wished to foment disorder in the
country, with a view to changing the current
political order, inviting the political class to return
to the negotiating table to determine a calendar for
the succession of the head of state, without
violating the Arusha accord.81 A meeting of the
G6, at which the candidate, Epitace
79 ICG interview, Arusha, 26/02/01.
80 ICG interview, member of government, Bujumbura,
18/02/01.
81 PANA Bulletin, 06/02/01.
Bayaganakandi, was to present his New Year's
message, was scheduled for January the 7th. The
national documentation services intervened to
prevent the meeting being held and disperse those
trying to attend.82 Similarly, the journalists of the
national press are regularly intimidated to
discourage them from covering Epitace
Bayaganakandi's candidature or from reporting the
rebels' political positions.83 Alphonse Rugambarara
and Joseph Nzeyimana, leaders of the MSP-
Inkinzo and RADDES, respectively, and two
outspoken opponents of Pierre Buyoya, were also
threatened with arrest, in February 2001, for
embezzlement, which they were said to have
committed, for the former, during his ministerial
mandate under the government convention, and,
for the latter, during his controversial management
of the national lottery.84 Alphonse Rugambarara
was finally thrown into prison on March 31, 2001.
Charged with flagrantly insulting the President, he
was arrested on leaving a press conference
organised by the G6 parties, during which he
violently attacked the government. That signatory
of the Arusha accord, a permanent member of the
implementation and monitoring committee, was
finally released on the day of the attempted putsch,
thanks particularly to the intercession of the
chairman of the IMC, the representative of the
Secretary General of the United Nations, Berhanu
Dinka.85
For the government and UPRONA, the
maintenance of the current President is not
negotiable. Both the government and UPRONA
have rejected, from the outset, the set-up of the
institutions recommended by the accord and argue
they must remain strong to fight or negotiate with
the rebels. But in order to prevent that scenario
legitimising the armed struggle and the risk that the
parties having signed the Arusha accord renege,
the partial application of the institutions is also
being considered, as a function of the constraints
current at the time.86 Due to the necessity of
82 ICG participant observation, January 2001.
83 Cf. Minutes of a meeting of the minister of
communication with the main heads of the Burundi
media, mimeograph, 02/03/01.
84 ICG interview, Burundian political observer,
Bujumbura, 07/02/01.
85 ICG interviews, Western diplomats, Bujumbura,
24/04/01.
86 Burundian government, ‘The problems of
implementing the Arusha accord for peace and
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maintaining the war effort, the composition of the
transitional institutions requires thorough revision
in order to block all openings for the enemy. Since
the leaders in exile cannot return home in any case,
their participation in the transitional institutions is
excluded. For UPRONA-Rukingama,87 the
distribution of the jobs accepted in Arusha and the
sharing of the powers between the various
institutions must be reviewed, and only the cease-
fire and completion of the reform of the armed
forces should, in fact, determine the end of the first
transitional period, which cannot be pre-restricted
to a duration of eighteen months.88 In the absence
of a cease-fire, UPRONA proposes entirely
rewriting protocol II of the peace accord, in order
to remain in power under the pretext of
maintaining the resources to wage war. That option
would enable partial application of the accord,
while protecting the establishment’s interests. In
the meantime, in order to keep the hope of change
alive, the set-up of a regular meeting framework
for the signatories present in Burundi is considered
advisable.89
The regime’s strategy has, of course, scored the
most points with the FRODEBU representatives,
who are already members of the partnership. The
party did not manage to reach unanimity on the
candidature of Domitien Ndayizeye to lead the
transition. The party’s historical leaders, such as
the former President, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya,
the President of the national assembly, Léonce
Ngendakumana, or the current First Vice President,
Frédéric Bavumgivyumvira, share the
government’s concern with avoiding institutional
deadlock and defending the need for a transitional
constitution. They are also worried about their
future and contest the manner in which Domitien
Ndayizeye has been appointed FRODEBU’s
official candidate for the transitional period,
imposed by Jean Minani. Lastly, the historical
leaders fear the influence of the Rwandan school in
FRODEBU and the future transitional
                                                          
reconciliation in Burundi’, mimeograph, February
2001.
87 In 1998, Uprona split between the Mukasi wing and
the Rukingama wing, the latter clearly supporting the
current political power.
88 Letter from the central committee of the UPRONA
party, ‘Rebuilding the nation’, No. 22, February 2001.
89 ‘Government message on the state of progress of the
peace process in Burundi’, mimeograph, February
2001.
institutions.90 The Rwandan school, in fact,
consists of former Burundian refugees, having
lived in Rwanda, such as Domitien Ndayizeye,
who only returned to the country at the beginning
of the nineties, and are close to PALIPEHUTU and
the old Habyarimana regime. Those figures are
suspected of ethnic radicalism and links with the
FNL.
Léonce Ngendakumana had already held
discussions with the government in order for the
ratification of the peace accord by the national
assembly not to give rise to a political vacuum,
and, above all, in order for a prolongation of the
interim period, during which negotiations for the
cease-fire, negotiations on reservations and the
drafting of a transitional constitution, could
continue. Léonce Ngendakumana also went to
South Africa with Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, then
to the refugee camps, to attempt to bring the rebels
to the negotiating table and to defend his own
vision for the application of the Arusha accord.
The President of the national assembly defends the
idea that his institution is the only one able to
legitimately designate the transitional leader, a
procedure generally considered very favourable to
Pierre Buyoya, due to the weight of the
Nzojibwami wing in the party.91 Lastly, the heavy
work program prepared by the President of the
national assembly for the opening of the
parliamentary session at the start of April92 greatly
strengthens the government’s position. The
program gives the impression that the partnership
institutions are, in fact, the guarantors of
implementation of the peace accord, whose
integrity would be defended by the President of the
national assembly and the Vice President. The
90 Cf. ICG, ‘Burundi: Neither War nor Peace’, op. cit..
91 Pana Bulletin, citing the President of the assembly,
Léonce Ngendakumana, 13/03/01.
92 Bill to promulgate the transitional constitutional
arrangements act; bill for provisional immunity from
pursuit for politically-motivated crimes committed
before signature of the accord; bill enlarging the
transitional national assembly; bill creating the senate;
bill for general amnesty in favor of the parties’ and
political movements’ fighters for crimes other than
those of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and participation in coups; bill revising the
existing law on political parties; bill for the
procedures for pursuit and judgment of persons guilty
of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity;
bill restoring the rights of refugees. Cf. Burundi
office, Briefing paper No. 879, 03/04/01.
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presentation of bills addressing provisional
immunity for politically-motivated crimes
committed before the signature of the accord, and
providing for general amnesty in favour of the
parties’ and political movements’ fighters for
crimes other than those of genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and participation in
coups, also constituted an olive branch extended to
the rebels and Tutsi extremists to encourage them
to join the partnership and support the application
of the peace accord. Léonce Ngendakumana wants
to remove all pretexts for the rebels refusing the
peace accord and he is pushing for of urgent
completion of the negotiations between UPRONA
and FRODEBU, and withdrawal of the
reservations and the conditions for set-up of the
transitional institutions. Moreover, Frédéric
Bavumginyumvira appears to wish to be his own
successor in the context of a broadened
partnership. His unsuccessful attempt to become
the transitional presidential candidate of
FRODEBU elicited sympathy in the armed forces,
capitalising on the exercise of the preceding thirty
months of power in the context of the
partnership.93
This prospect for a return of a broadened
partnership has, of course, given rise to fractures in
FRODEBU, which the government wishes to
maintain with the future return of exiled leaders to
the country (in particular, Jean Minani and
Léonard Nyangoma). In order to enable that return,
the government has now accepted the presence of a
South-African force for the personal protection of
those leaders and to ensure implementation of the
peace accord. In addition, in the event of a cease-
fire, the government has conceded the deployment
of a United Nations observers’ mission of the
MONUC-type in Burundi.94 Another alternative
was submitted to Nelson Mandela at the start of
May and to the same end: formation of a ’pre-
transition’ government for an indefinite period,
including the signatories of the accord present in
the country, pending a cease-fire which would lead
to the real transition.95 Nothing could be less
convincing.
93 ICG interview, FRODEBU member and the
government, Bujumbura, 27/01/01.
94 ICG interview, Burundian political observers and
members of government, Bujumbura, 17-19/02/01.
95 RTNB Bulletin, Interview with Pierre Buyoya on his
return from South Africa, 07/05/01.
Finally, despite the government’s intrigues and
pressures, the Burundian political parties have, in
their vast majority, resisted the call to approve
Pierre Buyoya’s candidature for leadership of the
transition. The session of the Arusha signatories on
March 19 closed its proceedings with the
controversial appointment of the G6 candidate,
Colonel Epitace Bayaganakandi, as President of
the transition, and that of the G7 candidate,
Domitien Ndayizeye, as Vice President of the first
term of the transition. That tandem, derived from
the alliance of 14 Hutu and Tutsi political parties,
will be submitted to the mediator, who will
convene a new summit to ratify the choice of the
political parties.
This time, irrespective of the pressure from the
heads of state of the region, the signatories of the
accord have rejected Pierre Buyoya and are liable
to paralyse the IMC, if their wishes are not
respected. But for as long as the partition of Pierre
Buyoya’s power has not been negotiated (reforms
of the security forces, judiciary, impunity, access
to resources), any attempt to impose an alternative
formula will fail, and the government will, in its
turn, be able to block the IMC’s work or simply
refuse to relinquish power, triggering a political
crisis, from which the peace process would
probably not recover.
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C. THE BAYAGANAKANDI-NDAYIZEYE
OPTION: A FALSE ALTERNATIVE, YET A
REAL THREAT
Despite the media presence of their partisans, the
alternative 'Epitace Bayaganakandi - Domitien
Ndayizeye' has little chance of winning the
leadership of the transition. Since the signature of
the peace accord, Pierre Buyoya is clearly stronger
at regional and international level96 and, even
though his personal popularity is at its lowest, the
power he can bring to bear has not been
fundamentally eroded. The balance of power,
particularly military power, is still greatly in his
favour. A pressure strategy intended to advance an
alternative, in principle, to Pierre Buyoya for the
transition and to undermine his pretension of being
the only Tutsi military officer able to negotiate the
cease-fire, the 'Epitace-Domitien' candidature is
above all exemplary of the general rejection of the
status quo, espoused by the broadened partnership,
and the need for change at the head of the country.
Irrespective of the security threat, the Tutsi camp
has not been able to unite behind the head of state.
Despite its commitment to restoring the
constitutional legitimacy of 1993, the Hutu camp
cannot unite against him either. The 'Epitace-
Domitien' alternative thus reflects the dissociation
of the military and political views and the dramatic
fragmentation of the political forces in Burundi.
That fragmentation has become a threat to the
peace process.
1.  An attempt to weaken the enemy
The Epitace Bayaganakandi-Domitien Ndayizeye
ticket is a surprising alliance, which has never
received the clear and massive support of
FRODEBU militants, or that of the coalition
around the former minister of the interior. The
dispute between the two camps is too great for the
association of their representatives to be credible
or represent a real threat to Pierre Buyoya.
First, the FRODEBU militants suspect Colonel
Epitace Bayaganakandi of some responsibility in
the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in
October 1993. The militants accuse him of having
become aware, several days in advance, of the
plotting against the elected President, having been
96 Cf. ICG, 'Burundi: ni guerre, ni paix', op. cit..
forewarned by the gendarmerie, and of having
done nothing to save the head of state.97 They also
accuse Epitace Bayaganakandi of being
responsible for the killings in the 'triangle of death'
in the Gihosha quarter, situated to the North of the
town of Bujumbura, perpetrated by members of the
national army, in February 1994, a few days after
the investiture of President Cyprien Ntaryamira.
Similarly, many of the party's members still recall
Epitace Bayaganakandi's decree suspending the
FRODEBU party in November 1997, when he was
Minister of the Interior. The move won him the
confidence of many members of the Tutsi
community, who see him as a true defender of that
minority's interests, but, of course, generated
distrust among FRODEBU sympathisers and
members. They are also distrustful of the support
Epitace Bayaganakandi claims from the anti-
Arusha 'rejection front' (UPRONA Mukasi wing,
PA-Amasekanya, JRR, etc.).
Why has the alliance between FRODEBU and
Colonel Bayaganakandi come into being? Is it
because of Domitien Ndayizeye's personal
ambition, his lust for power and its attributes? It
was undoubtedly necessary to maintain the
pressure on the head of state and give the
impression that a possible alternative existed,
whatever it might be. In addition, the legitimate
fear of indefinite maintenance in power of Pierre
Buyoya and lassitude with regard to UPRONA's
dilatory and divisionist manoeuvres are real
concerns in FRODEBU's ranks.98 By playing
FRODEBU against CNDD and Jean Minani
against Léonard Nyangoma and Augustin
Nzojibwami, Pierre Buyoya has ultimately given
the impression that he has no respect for his
political adversaries and wants to hang on to power
at all costs. Moreover, for Domitien Ndayizeye, the
need for a transitional constitution, defended by
UPRONA, has yet to be demonstrated. UPRONA
opposed the drafting of the constitution by
commission II in Arusha for two and a half years.
UPRONA's current requirement is only intended to
delay the inevitable. Two reference documents
already exist: the 1992 constitution and the peace
97 Colonel Epitace Bayaganakandi was appointed head
of the national gendarmerie by President Melchior
Ndadaye as soon as the latter had assumed his
responsibilities on July 10, 1993.
98 ICG interview, FRODEBU parliamentarian,
Bujumbura, 26/04/01.
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agreement. A third would only add to the
confusion.99 Lastly, Pierre Buyoya is sometimes
perceived as a partner who is too powerful for joint
management of the transition. Thus, a weaker,
foreseeable, and hence controllable, enemy, such
as Colonel Bayaganakandi, would be preferable.
So, why waste this opportunity to dismantle the
Bururi power base?
The dissensions of FRODEBU with respect to
Buyoya's candidature put the party in a difficult
position. The party cannot eternally maintain two
diametrically opposed views and maintain
negotiations with both camps. From October 2000
to January 2001, discreet negotiations between
Jean Minani and the head of state, or their
respective teams, were held in Dar-es-Salaam,
Malawi, and even Arusha, with a view to
withdrawal of the reservations and agreement on
the procedure for setting up transitional institutions
and sharing the jobs. However, in parallel,
Domitien Ndayizeye was also negotiating the same
questions with the G6 parties.100 As the six-month
interim period drew to a close, FRODEBU
considered that the numerical superiority of the
thirteen parties arrayed behind the Domitien-
Epitace tandem would enable them to win the day.
Jean Minani then decided to break off negotiations
with UPRONA and to co-sign the thirteen parties'
declaration, finally rejecting Buyoya's candidature
for leadership of the transition, toward the end of
January 2001 in Arusha. FRODEBU chose to
attempt to have Pierre Buyoya's demise ratified by
the heads of state of the region on February 26,
2001. Nelson Mandela's categorical refusal to
accept the candidature of Epitace Bayaganakandi,
even as Vice President of the transitional period,
due to his poor knowledge of the peace process
and the absence of credibility of his supporters,
turned that dangerous gamble into a failure.
Following Lieutenant Ntakarutimana's attempted
putsch, the splits in FRODEBU widened once
again. An attempt at reconciliation and a concerted
approach, conducted in Nairobi on May 2 and 3,
2001, was unsuccessful. The option of a third Tutsi
99 ICG interview, general secretariat of FRODEBU,
Bujumbura, 08/02/01.
100 ICG interview, head of FRODEBU, Bujumbura,
28/04/01.
candidate was again considered.101 But, can such
an option be successfully implemented? For the
historical wing, the failure of the attempted coup
showed that Pierre Buyoya was the only possible
political partner for transition: the only Tutsi
military officer able to make the army accept the
massive incorporation of Hutu rebels and the only
Tutsi political leader liable to make the transitional
institutions work in a new partnership. The
presumed complicity of the officers involved in the
coup with the army's general staff and the breach
opened in the Tutsi camp are also grounds for
concern for the historical wing. The latter fears that
much more radical politicians, who categorically
reject the peace process, may seize power with the
support of part of the army and plunge the country
into chaos, putting an end to the peace process and
blindly eliminating the successors of Ndadaye.102
Conversely, Domitien Ndayizeye and Jean Minani
denounce the attempted putsch as manipulation by
political power and as an attempt to regain
credibility at national and international level.
Since the attempted putsch, the partisans of
candidate Bayaganakandi have been divided. The
G6 partisans initially considered that their rallying
to Pierre Buyoya should first be the subject of
negotiations. Rallying could not be taken for
granted. Furthermore, given the regionalist flavour
of the initiatives of those in power (overtures
towards the Bururi leaders, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
(PARENA) and Térence Nsanze (ABASA),
negotiations with Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye),
which demonstrated a commitment to protecting
the establishment rather than defending the
interests of the Tutsi community, rallying became
impossible. In addition, the alliance with the six
G7 parties enabled many more jobs in the
transitional institutions to be secured, scoring
points on Arusha, while UPRONA proved
somewhat parsimonious on the subject, refused to
negotiate real sharing of the dividends of power
and even threatened its natural political partners.
But the attempted putsch changed the deal.
Completely unexpectedly, it showed that the anti-
Buyoya officers were also anti-Arusha. Despite
Alphonse Rugambarara's and Joseph Nzeyimana's
denunciation of the farcical putsch that Buyoya
101 ICG interview, FRODEBU member, Nairobi,
06/05/01.
102 ICG interview, FRODEBU parliamentarian,
Bujumbura, 26/04/01.
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was believed by many to have plotted against
himself, Rugambarara and Nzeyimana issued
orders against the putsch to their militants. They
feared that their main media show, Arusha, would
disappear in the chaos following the coup.
Conversely, the partisans of the anti-Arusha
framework agreement, who also railed against the
farcical putsch, nonetheless hoped that it would
accelerate the fall of Pierre Buyoya and the final
demise of the peace accord.
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza's 'moral support' for the
mutinous officers also sounds like a veritable
threat to the peace process. Despite several visits to
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza in Kampala, Epitace
Bayaganakandi did not succeed in securing
PARENA's support. PARENA accuses Epitace
Bayaganakandi of having made up the file on the
1997 attacks on the mines and the conspiracy
against state security that led to the arrest of
several of the party's militants in February 1998,
and the long confinement of President Bagaza,
placed under house arrest.103 Moreover, officially,
the former head of state is also a candidate for
leadership of the transitional period. The arrest of
members of PARENA after the attempted putsch
shows that there is conflict within the Bururi
community. Even though Jean-Baptiste Bagaza is
the ideal scapegoat for the political responsibility
for the attempted putsch, it is clear that the
mutineers complicity lead directly to PARENA
supporters, even though that does not necessarily
implicate the former head of state, who is, in
addition, suspected by his own troops of an
agreement with Pierre Buyoya so as to obtain the
position of President of the senate during the
transitional period.104
In the final analysis, it is no longer the prospect of
the Epitace-Domitien tandem that threatens the
peace process, but the premature disappearance of
Pierre Buyoya, eliminated by a Tutsi extremist
rejecting the conclusion of the Arusha accord. The
arrival of that tandem in power, without the
drafting of a transitional constitution to offset the
shortcomings of the peace accord, and without any
trust between the main representatives of the
executive and with no cease-fire, would be
equivalent to a certain return to the 'government
103 ICG interview, Burundian political observer,
Bujumbura 06/02/01.
104 ICG interview, PARENA member, Arusha, 26/02/01.
convention' period of 1994-1996,105 i.e.
institutional deadlock and infighting at the heart of
the state over the slightest decision, which would
be possibly resolved by the threat of street fighting
and ethnic purification of parts of Bujumbura. That
catastrophic scenario shows the extent to which a
transitional constitution is indispensable. It will not
force the people of Burundi to work together if
they do not want to, but it will strengthen those
who want to make the peace process succeed in the
face of the dilatory tactics and litigious
manoeuvres of politicians with no interest in the
success of the process.
But, currently, if the peace process is not rapidly
unblocked, and if the direct negotiations between
FRODEBU and UPRONA to set up the transitional
period with assurances as to the departure of the
head of state do not bear fruit, another catastrophic
scenario, that of a true putsch, is also foreseeable.
Hence, the temptation of certain leaders to prepare
for violence.
2. The temptation to prepare for violence
FRODEBU has always been handicapped by its
scant hold on the main rebel movements,
particularly the CNDD, despite the fact that the
latter derives from its ranks. The party committed
to unarmed political struggle immediately after the
Ndadaye assassination, even though it may have
been conniving with the CNDD or PALIPEHUTU.
However, the attempts to control the rebellion
during the Arusha process, 'in the name of
imposition of the principle of the interests of the
majority', were not fruitful.106 Despite its efforts
and repeated meetings with the rebels since
Autumn 2000, FRODEBU, which obtained
postponement of the threat of regional sanctions in
order for FRODEBU to intervene with the rebels,
did not succeed in imposing its political leadership
on the armed movements. The Majorca meeting in
January 2001, engineered by Jean Minani to
restore his credibility with the G7 group in the face
of Léonard Nyangoma and the CNDD, delivered
little of note. None of the real leaders of the
rebellion attended and the meeting only gave rise
105 Cf. ICG, 'Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political
Parties, Freedom of the Press and Political Prisoners',
Central Africa Report No. 23, 12/07/01.
106 ICG interview, member of the Tanzanian facilitators,
Arusha, 27/01/01.
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to a declaration of principle on the convergence of
the views of the G7 and rebel movements with
regard to the strengths and gaps of the Arusha
accord.107 The rebel movements deny that
FRODEBU can represent their interests and
require, as a prerequisite for any discussion, that
FRODEBU quit the partnership.108 Thus,
FRODEBU, the fallen star of Arusha, with no
control over the rebellion, divided, and with no
grip on the course of events, is threatened by
marginalization. FRODEBU also risks paying for
the degradation of the situation in the armed forces
and the violent seizure of power by an anti-Arusha
Tutsi lobby.
At a time where the peace process is more than
ever threatened by the belligerents, political
strength is liable to be measured in the potential for
military damage. Léonard Nyangoma's CNDD has
clearly perceived this. The former head of
propaganda with FRODEBU did not hesitate to
distance himself from the results of the Arusha
accord as of its signature.109 He has also moved
away from Domitien Ndayizeye, the G7 official
candidate for the leadership for the transitional
period, by presenting his own candidate,
Ambassador Albert Mbonerane. Remote from the
application of the peace accord, the CNDD is
positioning itself to obtain maximum benefit from
the negotiations on the instruments of power, if
those negotiations take place, and, in the
meantime, to portray itself as morally superior to
FRODEBU, first compromised by the 'government
convention', then by the partnership, with no
tangible result to show for it.110 For the CNDD,
given the situation in the country and the current
deadlock, 'the fundamental question in Burundi is
not the transitional period, but rather the creation
of a new national army and a new national police
force.' Showing disingenuous 'common sense',
Léonard Nyangoma stated: 'I think it would be
better not to put the cart before the horses, by
setting up a transitional government, as long as the
107 'Press release of the Burundian parties and democratic
movements meeting in Majorca, from January 5 to 7,
2001', mimeograph, 08/01/01.
108 ICG interview, liaison officers with the rebels,
Bujumbura, 24/04/01.
109 For further details, cf. ICG, 'Burundi: Ni guerre, ni
paix', op. cit., p. 17. & p. 21.
110 ICG interview, CNDD sympathizer, Nairobi,
28/03/01.
question of forming a new defence and security
organisation has not been decided.'111
In the recent context of the priority given to the
cease-fire, Léonard Nyangoma became aware of
the need to reaffirm his presence in the field and
mark points against FRODEBU. Léonard
Nyangoma thus withdrew from the G7 and, at the
same time, resumed contacts with his old networks
in Kigoma, Tanzania, while recruiting.112 In
parallel, in Arusha, the CNDD is pushing for
application of Article 2.B of the foreword to the
peace accord, which, in the absence of a cease-fire,
requires all the signatories to officially condemn
the belligerents and to exclude them from
negotiations on the reform of the security forces.
The implementation of that controversial article,
for which the FDD and FNL rejected the Arusha
accord, would in fact leave the CNDD practically
alone to negotiate the reform of the security forces
with the government and would undoubtedly result
in the drain of FDD fighters toward the CNDD,
while weakening the FRODEBU's political
credibility a little more.
The delay in the implementation of the accord,
which calls for repatriation of civilian refugees,
fighters and political leaders, subjects those groups
to the risk of a return to the bush as the call to
combat becomes increasingly strident.113 The
fighters having left the ranks of the rebellion and
grouped together in the 'front for national salvation
and rescue' (Front du salut et du sauvetage
national) deplore that, since the signature, they
have had no contact with the facilitators, while
fearing the arrangements that may be made
between Buyoya's regime and Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye.114
Currently, FRODEBU is also greatly interested in
the deserters. FRODEBU does not exclude the
option of war in the event of violation of the
accord. For FRODEBU, the deserters thus
constitute a force that may be needed.115 However,
111 Dispatch, Fondation Hirondelle, 28/02/01.
112 ICG interview, member of the Tanzanian mediation
team, Arusha, 24/03/01.
113 Ibid.
114 ICG interview, liaison officer with the rebels,
Bujumbura, 25/04/01.
115 ICG interview, FRODEBU member, Bujumbura,
18/03/01
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since the FDD and FNL have moved closer
together and since the change in command in the
latter, delegations have also been dispatched to
persuade the deserters of a change in direction and
the dividends to be obtained from intensifying the
armed struggle. Many are thus courted and
threatened in the suburbs of Kigoma and Dar-es-
Salaam and subject to pressure from the parties and
belligerents. Urgent action is required with respect
to those groups who, in the absence of any other
contacts, are liable to slip back into violence.
In that context, it is urgent for the facilitators to
reverse the direction of the negotiations and offer a
reward for peace, instead of favouring the rebel
leaders on the basis of their ability to do harm. The
rebellion is currently too fragmented for it to be
possible to maintain illusory negotiations with
rebel chiefs using violence as a means of applying
pressure, without necessarily representing all the
forces. Many fighters are ready to lay down their
arms if they are offered an opportunity of
benefiting from the peace process. Unless the FNL
and FDD leaders produce a tangible sign in support
of the peace process, such as the unilateral
declaration of a truce, the facilitators should create
conditions for the reception and census of 'Front du
salut et du sauvetage national' fighters in Tanzania
and make the latter the preferred targets of the
professional reinsertion plans or incorporation in
the army. The fighters should be offered the means
of choosing their representatives for negotiations
on reform of the security forces from among the
signatories of the Arusha accord. In that context,
the facilitation requires a radical change in
approach and methodology.
D. A PROCESS WITHOUT CLEAR DIRECTION
1. The Accord implementation and
monitoring committee, a costly arena of
interminable debate
The ultimate illustration of the current
impossibility of applying the Arusha accord is
supplied by the scandal already generated by the
indecent spectacle of the proceedings of the
implementation and monitoring committee in
Arusha. Since the official announcement of the
launch of the activities of the Arusha accord
implementation and monitoring committee (IMC)
in November 2000, in Arusha, by the mediator,
Nelson Mandela, the institution has made little
progress. Having selected Arusha as the
provisional headquarters, the discussions on the
internal rules, composition and site of the
headquarters of the IMC's executive board had still
not been completed in early March. The seemingly
endless debates on questions of procedure and the
position and salaries of the members have delayed
set-up.116 The IMC is being transformed into a
credit society for its members, a small forum for
perpetual negotiations, where the parties
procrastinate with no consciousness of the urgency
of their task or the suffering of the people of
Burundi. Each session costs U.S.$ 250,000. Some
representatives of the international community
have already threatened to suspend all financing
for IMC activities, if the committee does not
rapidly produce tangible results.117
In consequence, the session from March 19 to 24
finally produced a minimal result: an agreement
between the signatories, enabling the establishment
by the government of an inquiry commission
consisting of UN experts on the question of
political prisoners and the conditions of their
imprisonment, and the appointment of the thirteen
members of the executive board.118 The IMC has
also set up working groups responsible for
compiling a list of the provisions of the Burundian
legislative and regulatory texts, preventing or
interfering with the exercise of political freedoms
or constituting obstacles to application of protocol
II of the accord. The working groups are also
responsible for preparing the awareness campaign
116 ICG interview, UNO diplomat, Nairobi, 27/03/01.
117 ICG interview, Western diplomat, Nairobi, 06/04/01.
118 AFP dispatch, 25/03/01.
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to be conducted by the mediator, accompanied by
the signatories and the IMC members, in Burundi
and outside it. However, the exclusion of
PARENA from the debates (PARENA has not
signed the undertaking to support implementation
of the peace accord) and the absence of
negotiations on the reservations formulated by the
signatories with respect to the contents of the
accord will make the IMC an arena for endless
debates and paralysis instead of an institution
supporting its implementation. The IMC should be
suspended so that its method of operating can be
reviewed and corrected, so as to optimise results
and effectiveness.
2. Nelson Mandela: an unclear mediation
The implementation of the accord also suffers from
the indecision and undeniable hesitation of the
South African mediation. Other than increased
delegation of responsibilities to Vice President
Zuma, Nelson Mandela does not seem to have a
very clear view of the method of pulling Burundi
out of conflict. Weary of a formula that he himself
resumed when he could have changed it, Nelson
Mandela gives way to the facility of ethnic
arithmetic or to systematic threats of resignation,
military intervention, etc. Facilitation by the South-
African team seems uncertain, both with regard to
the form and the substance.
With regard to the substance, the decision to opt
for ethnic sharing in the security forces, and again
for the ethnic sharing of leadership over the
transitional period, is questionable. The facilitation
team should not forget that, while the Burundi
conflict is indeed anchored in the fears, prejudices
and debt of blood between the two communities of
Burundi, it is nonetheless essentially a political
conflict, in which ethnic considerations are only
one of the dimensions. The stakes in the conflict
are power and its instruments (army, judiciary,
wealth) while ethnic considerations, such as home
regions, are only their vehicles of expression. The
problem is thus not only one of sharing power
between the Tutsis and Hutus, but above all of
ensuring the future of a new system of governance
in Burundi, in which the access to the instruments
of power will be controlled, limited and equitable.
Such an objective cannot be achieved by replacing
one system of domination by another, or by
organising institutional cosmetics. The Burundian
refugees deserve much more than a few hours on
an overloaded agenda, during which Nelson
Mandela formulates a surrealistic discourse on
preparations for return, while the fighting is still
raging in the country.119 The refugees were not
deceived. They replied to the facilitator's
injunctions by stating that he should instead begin
by returning power to those from whom it was
taken and ensuring the end of the Tutsi monopoly
control over the security forces.120
With regard to form, Nelson Mandela should
understand that, even though he obtained the
signature of the Arusha accord by force, he cannot
obtain the cease-fire or its application the same
way. The people of Burundi have already buried
Julius Nyerere, and one facilitator more or less will
not make much difference. Moreover, when threats
are not supported by a tangible capability for
action, the effect is counterproductive. The rebels
made fun of the threats of sanctions and
international and regional condemnation in
September 2000. They also took note of the United
Nations Secretary General's refusal when the
facilitators requested the establishment of a force
to maintain peace, pursuant to Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. A sustained regional and international
diplomatic effort is necessary in order to create a
united front behind the facilitation. Nelson
Mandela's name and his threats to resign will not
be enough. A genuine negotiating strategy, based
on equally substantial shuttle diplomacy
addressing the belligerents and the states in the
region, is equally important. Nelson Mandela has
neither the patience nor the time, and does not
seem to wish to surround himself by a
professional, international negotiating team to
achieve that end. Delegating sections of the
negotiations to Vice President Zuma is no solution.
The gaps in Nelson Mandela's facilitation are
exemplified by the fact that he did not go with
Jacob Zuma to Gabon to meet with President
Bongo, with a view to consultation and
formulation of a concerted position, nor to Dar-es-
Salaam to discuss Tanzania's important role in the
resolution of the conflict.
Despite President Bongo's promises to remain
faithful to the framework of Arusha, Burundi
119 Cf. IRIN Great Lakes Update No. 1124, 28/02/01.
120 'Requests And Suggestions Presented by the
Burundian Refugees To Mandela', JRS Alert Burundi,
23/03/01.
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cannot allow rivalry between the French and
English-speaking facilitators to continue. Closer
consultations with France are required in order to
co-ordinate efforts, ensure their consistency and
not disperse them. The Western and regional
powers must not provide the belligerents with the
possibility of playing French and English speaking
heads of state against each other, nor the
facilitators against each other. A joint effort was
possible for the Paris Conference; there is no
reason for it not to be possible to obtain a cease-
fire. Similarly, the FNL must not negotiate in
South Africa while the FDD negotiate in
Libreville. The rebels must meet the government
and the belligerents must be confronted with a
united regional and international front.
III. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK
Burundi is not ready for implementation of the
Arusha peace accord. Not only are the rebels at
war, but neither the reservations, nor power
sharing, nor even the departure from power of
Pierre Buyoya, have been negotiated.
Implementing the accord in a hostage situation
would give too much room to move to the
belligerents, who are ready to keep or take power
at any cost. Before implementing the accord,
negotiations on Bururi’s power must be completed,
the operational effectiveness of the transitional
institutions strengthened, and the belligerents
weakened so that they can accept the logic of
peace. This new stage in the negotiations requires
two essential conditions: an end to the uncertainty
with respect to the transitional leadership, and
release from the Arusha formula.
A. REORGANISING RESPONSIBILITIES
WITHIN THE FACILITATION PROCESS
AND DEFINING A COHERENT MEDIATION
STRATEGY FOR LIBREVILLE AND
PRETORIA
The mediation hesitations over the last few
months, with respect to both the transition dossier
and the cease-fire dossier, have become
counterproductive. It is becoming urgent for
Mandela to clarify the mediation responsibilities
and establish a facilitation strategy, which he could
subsequently leave a competent team to
implement. In this context, Vice President Zuma
could complete the negotiations on the transitional
institutions in Pretoria and President Bongo could
be officially designated by the region as the co-
facilitator responsible for negotiations on the
cease-fire. The FNL and FDD would thus go to
Libreville together to negotiate the cease-fire and
reform of the armed forces with the government,
while UPRONA and FRODEBU could negotiate,
under Jacob Zuma's mediation, the withdrawal of
their reservations and the drafting of a transitional
constitution. It would be up to Nelson Mandela
alone to obtain assurances from Pierre Buyoya
with respect to his departure from power. The
reorganisation must be accompanied by a marked
increase in the personnel of the Mandela
Foundation.
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B. SOLVING THE TRANSITIONAL
LEADERSHIP QUESTION ONCE AND FOR
ALL
Peace and reconciliation are not negotiated with
one's friends, but with one's enemies. On the basis
of that conviction, a third way is necessary to settle
the transitional leadership problem. Pierre Buyoya
and Domitien Ndayizeye are the two candidates
who most clearly represent their two camps. The
facilitator should therefore invest them with
responsibility for the composition of the
transitional government and the offices of the
national assembly and senate, and leave them to
negotiate with the other political parties. Openings
should be left for the representatives of the rebels,
such as, for example, secretaries of state for
defence or the ministry of the interior. Partisan
political coalitions will never reach an agreement
otherwise, and even though the broadened
partnership solution affords a greater chance of
application of the peace accord than the solution of
a return to the 'government convention', it is not
satisfactory. The solution is too biased in favour of
UPRONA and looks too much like disguising the
status quo in order to obtain adhesion.
UPRONA and FRODEBU, as the main historical
political forces in the country, should be the
architects of the transition. Pierre Buyoya can
rightly claim that he has not been defeated
militarily or politically and that his signature on the
cease-fire agreement will commit the vast majority
of the armed forces. Moreover, it is his power that
is in question and it is his right to obtain an
honourable exit, so that he will be remembered in
the history of the country as the man who initiated
the democratisation process and brought the
company to safety after several years of chaos. The
contemporary political and security situation is, in
fact, still better than that in 1996. But the need for
change remains urgent. Change can only be
obtained by negotiating certain guarantees for
Pierre Buyoya's departure with the interested
parties. Following his departure from power, his
protection and that of certain people close to him
should be guaranteed. Those guarantees should be
ratified and recognised by the international
community in order to prevent any risk of legal
proceedings outside the country. Were the head of
state not to accept such negotiations, the members
of the Security Council could rightly declare that
the head of state has reneged on his undertakings
with respect to the peace accord. The Security
Council could then support all legal or
administrative procedures against the head of state
and those close to him, such as visa restrictions and
the freezing of foreign assets. Under no
circumstances should the current head of state
obtain leadership of the first half of the transitional
period.
C. CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON
POWER SHARING IN A NON-INCLUSIVE
AND FINAL MANNER BY DRAFTING A
TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION
Following the appointment of the transitional
leadership, a three-month period is largely
sufficient for UPRONA and FRODEBU to
formulate a transitional constitution resolving the
problem of compatibility between the peace accord
and 1992 constitution and drastically reducing the
powers of the executive in order to entrust those
powers to Parliament. A reconciliation period
cannot be founded on an all-powerful executive. In
addition, the only assurance against Pierre Buyoya
hanging on to power indefinitely resides in
partially depriving the head of state of the
resources of political control and domination. In
particular, this requires the exclusion of the Bururi
oligarchy from all positions enabling accumulation
and misappropriation of international funds. This
would be the price for accepting Pierre Buyoya as
transitional leader. That institutional safeguard
would, in addition, protect the country from any
temptation Domitien Ndayizeye may face to make
the same mistakes. Clear procedures for
administrative and political appointments, and for
disbursement of international aid, must be clearly
stated. Certain institutions that were established in
order to divert national resources (coffee, tea) and
international income flows must also be
eliminated.
Instead of once again convening a meeting
between the heads of state in Arusha, the
mediation should convene a meeting of the main
signatory parties in Pretoria for a dual series of
negotiations. First, Nelson Mandela should
negotiate the terms  of the departure of Pierre
Buyoya at the end of the first eighteen months of
transition. The agreement will provide the
necessary guarantees with respect to the national
and international legal and political protection of
the head of state and certain of those close to him.
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The agreement will require the approval of the
United Nations.
Secondly, the mediation should also ensure a
meeting between UPRONA and FRODEBU to
negotiate power sharing by drafting a transitional
constitution. The mediation will guarantee the
defence of the political interests of the other parties
during those negotiations. The rebels' political
representatives should be present as observers to
enable them to express their wishes. UPRONA and
FRODEBU will also have to review the method of
operation of the Accord implementation and
monitoring committee, so that the IMC is the
guarantor of the spirit of Arusha, but also reflects
the results of the Pretoria negotiations.
The results of the second series of negotiations
should subsequently be presented to the Arusha
accord signatory parties, who should decide
whether or not to accept them. Those who agree
will sign the Pretoria accord, complementary to the
Arusha accord, and participate in the transitional
institutions. The others should be excluded.
D. CEASE-FIRE: CONFIRMING THE
REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE REBEL
GROUPS AND OFFERING AN INCENTIVE
TO STOP FIGHTING
The fear of not benefiting from the future
advantages of peace, together with the multiple
threats of sanctions proffered by the region and
international community, have persuaded certain
rebel units to stop fighting. They also fear that their
fate will be the same as the Rwandan Interahamwe
militia and ex-FAR, namely that they will be
definitively characterised as 'negative forces' and
excluded from the negotiations on the reform of
the security services.121 Those units have therefore
placed themselves in the position of awaiting
repatriation, pending potential incorporation into
the army or socio-professional reintegration.
Similarly, both during the Libreville process and
the most recent South-African consultations
between Vice President Zuma and the FNL, the
leaders of the rebellion seem to want to follow the
general trend of the negotiations, even if they
121 ICG interview, contact with the deserters, Bujumbura,
January 27, 28 and 29, 2001.
advance their own conditions. Seeking to impose
conditions while escalating the violence is
unacceptable. During the negotiations, incentives
must be given to the partisans of peace, and not to
the partisans of war. As the experience of progress
in the Lusaka accord has shown, the leaders who
show themselves to be the most harmful are not
those that have a real interest in peace. Thus the
rebel leaders must supply firm evidence of their
support for the peace process and show that they
are really representative of the forces present in the
field, before looking to positions in the armed
forces. If that is not done, the rebel leaders and all
forces opposing the progress of the peace accord
should be treated in a manner identical to that of
the 'negative forces' defined under the Lusaka
accord.
It is important for the international community to
define, as of now, the conditions for financing
reform of the army. Burundi cannot afford the
luxury of two sets of negotiations in Arusha. If the
rebel leaders do not wish to negotiate reform of the
army, the facilitation may legitimately consider
FRODEBU, the CNDD and FROLINA as the
legitimate spokesmen of the rebels and entrust
them with the task of identifying, conducting a
census of, and representing the rebels who wish to
lay down their arms and support the peace accord,
with the assistance of the Tanzanian and
Congolese governments.
At the same time, an incentive must be offered to
the fighters who wish to lay down their arms and to
the rebel leaders who have decided to support the
peace process, by considering them preferred
candidates for socio-professional reinsertion or
incorporation in the future security forces. In the
absence of a corresponding commitment from the
leadership of the FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL,
the region must undertake to facilitate contacts
between the 'Forces du salut et du sauvetage
national' and FRODEBU, the CNDD and
FROLINA, so that the latter can effectively
represent their interests in the course of the
negotiations on the reform of the security forces.
The negotiations must be initiated as soon as
possible, irrespective of the result of the Libreville
meetings.
With four months the rebels have sufficient time to
provide evidence of their representativeness and
support for the peace process. If they do not do so,
the Congolese and Tanzanian governments should
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be technically and financially aided by the
international community in order to neutralise the
'negative forces' refusing the peace accord, and
identifying and associating the rebels who have
decided to support the peace process, and to whom
priority will be given for the reform of the armed
forces. Under no circumstances, can
implementation of the peace accord be postponed
beyond August 28, 2001, i.e. the first anniversary
of the signature of the Arusha accord.
E. ELICITING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
INVOLVEMENT OF REGIONAL
GOVERNMENTS
A cease-fire cannot take place without the co-
operation, support and joint efforts of the
Congolese, Tanzanian, Rwandan and Ugandan
governments and South-African mediation.
Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo
have a particular role to play. There can be no
peace in Burundi without their contribution. The
presence of 380,000 refugees, mainly Hutus on
Tanzanian soil, the sometimes contested role of the
Tanzanian facilitation, and certain anti-Tutsi
declarations from important members of the
Tanzanian political class, maintain the permanent
suspicion of the administration and security forces'
complicity with the Hutu rebels.
However, any open condemnation of the
Tanzanian government with reference to a situation
in which that government does not hold all the
keys is counterproductive. Condemnation would be
liable to cause adverse reactions with respect to the
Burundi peace process, and, hence, undoubtedly
render it fragile. Subsequent to the death of Julius
Nyerere, the first facilitator of the peace process,
President Mkapa should be encouraged and helped
to make the most productive contribution to
settling the conflict, by affording the material
conditions necessary to offer an incentive to those
laying down their arms. The identification and
association of the fighters prepared to support the
peace process can only be conducted on Tanzanian
soil and the international community should now
set up the structure which will enable that end to be
achieved, in co-operation with the Tanzanian
government.
Similarly, just as the Congolese government's
support is necessary for the neutralisation of the
'negative forces' scheduled by the Lusaka accord,
the same government's contribution will be
indispensable to that provided for under the
Pretoria accords. In that context, the support given
by President Joseph Kabila to the Libreville
process should be sustained and completed by his
participation, as a regional observer, in the Pretoria
accords. President Kabila should sign the final
document. In exactly the same way, the unanimous
support from the other countries involved in the
Regional Initiative on Burundi is indispensable in
order for the peace process to achieve its
objectives. The signatory parties must not be able
to play on regional divisions to weaken their
adversaries and must be presented with a united
front backing the solutions defined within the
framework of the negotiations.
F. HARMONISING THE TERMS OF THE
ARUSHA AND LUSAKA PEACE
PROCESSES
Harmonisation of the Lusaka accord and the
Burundi peace negotiations with respect to the
status of the rebel forces is necessary. The
Mandela team could appoint a liaison official for
the two processes.
In any event, rebels who do not seize the
opportunities offered by the Mandela mediation
and the new Pretoria negotiations to achieve their
political objectives are not interested in peace.
Such rebels are either blinded by their ethnic
chauvinism and spread the ideology of genocide,
or have definitively become mercenaries. In both
cases, such rebel forces are now completely
divorced from the negotiated settlement of the
Burundi conflict. In that case, the Pretoria
negotiations must instigate definition of a 'negative
forces' status for the Burundi peace process,
comparable to that used in the Lusaka accords.
The 'negative forces' that find pretexts for refusing
negotiations and continuing the fighting are to be
dealt with in the context of a program of
disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation and
reintegration, and subjected, where appropriate, to
legal proceedings for war crimes and crimes
against humanity, with the active technical and
financial support of the international community.
In that context, it is essential for the United
Nations Security Council to support that option
and encourage its member states to mobilise, as of
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now, to provide the assistance necessary for
implementation of the DDRR program.
G. RESUMING INTERNATIONAL AID TO
ALLEVIATE SUFFERING AND REVIVE
ECONOMIC PRODUCTION.
Last, the resumption of international aid is an
urgent necessity. The aid should focus first on
alleviating the suffering of the people and reviving
the national economy. Special attention should be
paid to controlling the use of aid to minimise the
risks of corruption, which has exploded in the
country, and to supporting productive activities
(agricultural production, food processing, etc.).
The renewal of aid must be accompanied by
structural reforms of the Burundian economy in
order to ensure that the state, albeit in transition,
can under no circumstances misappropriate
farmers' revenues, as was the case in the past. The
necessary liberalisation of agricultural distribution
and the supply systems for consumer goods and
derivative products must be accompanied by
massive support for the educational and health-care
sectors, without the exclusive control being left to
the state's machinery. All of Burundi's population
must directly experience the incentives for peace
and change in governance, with the negotiations as
the necessary outcome.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Civil war is on Burundi’s doorstep. The Burundi
peace process is adrift. Without a rapid resumption
of negotiations using a formula different from that
of Arusha, providing an incentive for stopping
fighting, it would be indecent for the international
community to continue to finance implementation
of the peace accord.
The facilitation team and the region as a whole
cannot continue to press for accord implementation
without assurances of compliance with its final
results. To do so would be a betrayal of the people
of Burundi. A radical change in the management of
the peace process is therefore necessary, in order to
provide assurances with respect to the short or
medium term departure of Pierre Buyoya, enabling
a transitional constitution to be drafted and
enabling review of the way in which the IMC
operates. In parallel, an incentive must be offered
to the belligerents who support the negotiations,
while those not doing so should be treated as
'negative forces' by the region and the international
community. That result will require effort,
assiduity, skill and determination. Those qualities
are currently lacking in the Mandela facilitation. It
is therefore urgent that an international negotiating
team be formed to work full time on the Burundi
dossier. It is also urgent for the Mandela
facilitation to create a united regional and
international front for resolution of the conflict.
That is the price to be paid for peace. It is high
time that all those supposed to be facilitating peace
appreciate this.
APPENDIX A
TABLE 1: MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS IN BURUNDI
Public
corporation









1998 Director of the
budget
Bururi Tutsi
2 RSA HAJAYANDI Joseph 1996 Pilot Mechanic Bururi Tutsi
3 ONATOUR Mme
HAMENYIMANA
1997 Director, MFP Bururi Tutsi
4 LNBTP BIRABISHA Didace 1994 --- Bururi Tutsi
5 APEE BAKANIBONA
Joseph
1997 Advisor Bururi Tutsi
6 REGIDESO NIYONGABO
Philippe
1996 Advisor Bururi Tutsi
7 ON TOURISME NIMENYA Nicomède 1997 C.E. Bururi Tutsi
8 COTEBU SINDAYIHEBURA
Célestin
1996 ECODI Bururi Tutsi
9 VERRUNDI SIMBARAKIYE
Evariste
Closed Minister Bururi Tutsi
10 CHU KAMENGE GIKORO 1992 Physician Bururi Tutsi
11 OTB NIMUBONA Salvator 1996 C.E. Bururi Tutsi
12 MUTUELLE FP NKENGURUTSE
Auguste

















1982 --- Bururi Tutsi
17 PAFE CISHAHAYO Gérard 1996 Advisor Bururi Tutsi
18 EPB NTEZIRIBA Protais 1992 Director Bururi Tutsi
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20 ONATEL NDABIHORE
Augustin
2000 Consultant Mwaro Tutsi
21 SOSUMO BARUTWANAYO
Numérien
2000 Customs Ruyigi Tutsi
22 RN POSTES BAMBASI Pierre 1998 Minister Muyinga Hutu
23 RPP BIZONGWAKO 1998 --- Ruyigi Tutsi
24 LONA NZEYIMANA Joseph 1996 Minister Gitega Tutsi
25 OCIBU NIYIKIZA
Barthélémy
1996 --- Kayanza Hutu





27 HPRC --- --- --- --- Tutsi
28 AIR BURUNDI GATOTO 2000 Pilot Muyinga Tutsi
29 ECOSAT --- 2000 --- Buja
Rural
Tutsi
30 COGERCO KABURA François 1996 --- Makamba Tutsi
31 SCEP BANYANKIYE 1996 Secretary Bujumbur
a
Tutsi





2000 Minister Mwaro Tutsi
34 ARCT MISIGARO 2000 C.E. Bururi Tutsi
35 SETEMU GIRIKWISHAKA V. 1999 Project director Muramvy
a
Tutsi
36 INSP Dr Martin 2000 Physician Bururi Tutsi
37 ENS NDITIJE Charles 1999 Professor Bururi Hutu
38 ISCO MAKOBERO
Barthelemy
1997 Professor Bururi Tutsi
Source: 'La Lumière', No. 10, 20/01/01, p. 4.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 2: 'REGIONALISM IN THE ARMY: THE LAST BASTION'





2 Haziyo Serge Major Ministerial principal private secretary Bururi
3 NIYUNGEKO
Vincent
Major General Chief of Staff, Army Bururi
4 NDARYIYUMVIRE
Salvator
Colonel Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie Mwaro
5 BARUTWANAYO Major Aide de Camp, Army Bururi
6 NIYEREMA Major Aide de Camp, Gendarmerie Bururi
7 NDAYISABA Colonel Director General, Operation and
Intelligence
Bururi
8 CISHAHAYO Colonel Director General, Budget and
Procurement
Bururi
9 GAHIRO Colonel Commander, 1st military region Bururi
10 BISANZAGI Colonel Commander, 3rd military region Bururi
11 NIYOYUNGURUZA Colonel Commander, 4th military region Bururi
12 BIJONYA Colonel Commander, 5th military region Bururi
13 NIYOYANKANA Colonel Commander, 2nd military region Gitega
14 BUJEJE Colonel G3 Bururi
15 NDIKURIYO Colonel G2 Bururi
16 NIYONKURU Colonel G1 Bururi
17 BANDYABANZI Colonel G5 Bururi
18 GATEFERI Colonel Transport Director, Army Bururi
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21 NZOBONIMPA Colonel G2 Gendarmerie Bururi
22 KARIMBANE Colonel G4 Gendarmerie Bururi
23 JUMA Colonel Transport Director, MDN Bururi
24 KIBATI Colonel Transport / Administration Director Bururi
25 NIYONDAVYI Major Director of Health Bururi
26 KARIMWAMI Colonel Director of Schools and Secondary
Schools
Bururi
27 NDIKURIYO Major Director of Grants and Training
Courses
Bururi
28 MINANI Colonel Director of Communication Bururi
29 JUMA Commander Director of Physical Education / Sports Bururi
30 NIBIZI Colonel Director General, Human Resources Muramvya
31 NZABAMPEMA Colonel General Inspector Muramvya
32 CISHAHAYO Major Director of the Budget Muramvya
33 BANDONKEYE Colonel Director of Intelligence, MDN Mwaro
34 KARIHANZE Colonel G4 Karuzi
35 CONGERE Colonel Director of Army Engineering Muramvya
36 SINARINZI Colonel Director of Aviation Gitega
37 NTIBANONOKA Colonel G3 Gendarmerie Rural Buja
Source: 'La Lumière', No. 12, 15/03/01.
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APPENDIX C
GLOSSARY
A. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ARMED
MOVEMENTS*
ABASA: Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut
(Burundian-African alliance for salvation), created
in 1993. President: Térence Nsanze (external wing)
and Serge Mukamarakiza (interior wing)
ANADDE: Alliance Nationale pour le Droit et le
Développement Economique (national alliance for
law and economic development), created in 1993.
President: Patrice Nsababaganwa
AV-INTWARI: 'Alliance des Vaillants' (alliance
of the brave), created in 1993. President: André
Nkundikije
CNDD: Conseil National pour la Défense de la
Démocratie (national council for defense of the
democracy). Founded in 1994 by Léonard
Nyangoma, one of the founders of FRODEBU; and
minister of the interior of the Ntaryamira
government. Chairman: Léonard Nyangoma
FDD: Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
(forces for defense of democracy), the armed
branch of the CNDD. The FDD are divided into
the Léonard Nyangoma wing and the Jean-Bosco
Ndayikengurukiye wing
FNL: Forces Nationales pour la Libération
(national forces for liberation), the armed branch of
Palipehutu. The FNL were divided into the Etienne
Karatasi branch and Cossan Kabura branch in 1992
FRODEBU: Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi
(front for democracy in Burundi). Officially
recognized in 1992, the party won the first
presidential election organized in Burundi in June
1993. FRODEBU is presided over by Jean Minani
* Under the law on political parties in Burundi, the
presidents of political parties must remain in Burundi.
Generally, the presidents of the parties known as
'interior wing' parties are recognized by the Ministry
of the Interior.
(exterior wing) and Augustin Nzojibwami (interior
wing)
FROLINA: Front pour la Libération Nationale
(front for national liberation), created in the
eighties. President: Joseph Karumba
INKINZO: 'Le Bouclier' (the shield), created in
1993. President: Alphonse Rugambarara
PALIPEHUTU: Parti pour la Libération du
Peuple Hutu (party for the liberation of the Hutu
people). President: Etienne Karatasi
PARENA: Parti pour le Redressement National
(party for national recovery), created and presided
over by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, former President of
Burundi in 1995
PIT: Parti Indépendant pour les Travailleurs
(independent party for workers), created in 1993.
The PIT is presided over by Etienne Nyahoza
PL: Parti Libéral (liberal party), created in 1993.
The exterior wing is presided over by Gaëtan
Nikobamye and the interior wing, by Joseph
Ntidendereza
PP: Parti du Peuple (people's party), created in
1993. PP is presided over by Shadrack Niyonkuru
(exterior wing) and Séverin Ndikumugongo
(interior wing)
PRP: Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple (party
for the reconciliation of the people), supporting
return of the monarchy, created in 1992. The party
is presided over by Mathias Hitimana (exterior
wing) and Albert Girukwishaka (interior wing)
PSD: Parti pour la Socio-Démocratie (party for
social democracy), created in 1993 and presided
over by Godefroid Hakizimana
RADDES: Rassemblement pour la Démocratie, le
Développement Economique et Social (rally for
democracy and economic and social development),
created in 1993 and presided over by Joseph
Nzeyimana
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RPB: Rassemblement pour le Peuple du Burundi
(rally for the people of Burundi), created in 1993
and presided over by Philippe Nzobonariba
(interior wing) and Balthazar Bigirimana (exterior
wing)
ULINA: Union de Libération Nationale (union for
national liberation), a coalition of rebel
movements, created in 1996, presided over by
Cossan Kabura, and which disappeared two years
later due to internal dissensions
UPRONA: Union pour le Progrès National
(national union for progress). A nationalist party
created on the eve of independence in 1961 and
directed by Prince Louis Rwagasore, hero of
independence, assassinated in October 1961.
UPRONA was the single party in Burundi from
1966 to 1993. The party has two wings: one is
presided over by Charles Mukasi, and the other by
Luc Rukingama, the current minister of
communication
B. THE GROUPS G3, G7, G8, G10 AND G6
L’Alliance Nationale pour le Changement
(A.NA.C.) (national alliance for change):
FRODEBU, PP, PARENA, SOJEDEM, S.E.
Anatole Kanyenkiko, Honorable André Biha,
Honorable Térence Nahimana. A.NA.C was
created in December 1999
La Convergence Nationale pour la Paix et la
Réconciliation (CNPR) (national convergence for
peace and reconciliation): UPRONA, FRODEBU
(interior wing), PSD, RADDES, INKINZO, PIT,
ANADDE, ABASA (interior wing), and PL
(interior wing). The CNPR was created in October
1999
G3: consisting of UPRONA, the government and
the national assembly
G7: group for the 'Forces du Changement
Démocratique' (forces of democratic change),
formed by the parties largely or exclusively
consisting in Hutus: FRODEBU (exterior wing),
CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, PP, RPB and
PL
G8: grouping all the formations known as 'small
predominantly-Tutsi parties', namely: PARENA,
PRP, AV-INTWARI, ABASA, PSD, INKINZO,
ANADDE, and PIT
G6: G8 became G6 pursuant to the transitional
leadership question. PARENA and ABASA do not
support Epitace Bayaganakandi, the candidate
designated for transitional leadership by the other
six political parties in G8
G10: G8 became G10 until January 2001 pursuant
to the cease-fire question. UPRONA and the
government thus formed a front with small Tutsi
parties to require cessation of hostilities before
implementation of the accord. The coalition was
nonetheless dissolved over the issue of the
candidature of Epitace Bayaganakandi
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C. OTHER ACRONYMS
AC Génocide 'Cirimoso': Action Contre le
génocide 'Plus Jamais ça' (action against
genocide 'Never again') organizes meetings on the
21st of each month, in memory of the massacres of
October 1993, following the assassination of
President Ndadaye. The organization is presided
over by Venant Bamboneyeho
CSAA: Commission de suivi et d’application de
l’accord d’Arusha (Arusha accord implementation
and monitoring committee (IMC)), presided over
by the United Nations ambassador, Berhanu Dinka
FPR: Front Patriotique Rwandais (et Armée
Patriotique Rwandaise) (Rwandan patriotic front
(and Rwandan patriotic army)), created in
December 1987
JRR: Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore
(Rwagasore revolutionary youth) (organization
headed by UPRONA), created after independence
and currently presided over by Bonaventure
Gasutwa
PA-Amasekanya: Puissance d’Autodéfense
'Amasekanya' ('Amasekanya' self-defense power),
a youth organization created in 1995, and directed
by Diomède Rutamucero
RCD: Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Démocratie (Congolese rally for democracy), a
Congolese rebel movement, created in August
1998
SMO: Service Militaire Obligatoire (obligatory
military service) for secondary school pupils in
Burundi
SOJEDEM: Solidarité de la Jeunesse pour la
Défense des Minorités (youth solidarity for the
defense of minorities), created at end 1993, and
directed by Déo Niyonzi
Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock,
ICG Africa Report No29, 14 May 2001                                                                                                                   Page 39
APPENDIX D
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,
multinational organisation committed to
strengthening the capacity of the international
community to anticipate, understand and act to
prevent and contain conflict.
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts, based on the ground
in countries at risk of conflict, gather information
from a wide range of sources, assess local
conditions and produce regular analytical reports
containing practical recommendations targeted at
key international decision-takers.
ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials
in foreign ministries and international
organisations and made generally available at the
same time via the organisation's internet site,
www.crisisweb.org . ICG works closely with
governments and those who influence them,
including the media, to highlight its crisis
analysis and to generate support for its policy
prescriptions.  The ICG Board - which includes
prominent figures from the fields of politics,
diplomacy, business and the media - is directly
involved in helping to bring ICG reports and
recommendations to the attention of senior
policy-makers around the world.  ICG is chaired
by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari;
former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans
has been President and Chief Executive since
January 2000.
ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New
York and Paris. The organisation currently
operates or is planning field projects in nineteen
crisis-affected countries and regions across four
continents: Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,
Sudan and Zimbabwe in Africa;
Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia; Albania,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia in Europe; and Colombia in Latin
America.
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors.
The following governments currently provide
funding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China
(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. Foundation and private sector donors
include the Ansary Foundation, the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles Stewart
Mott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the
Ploughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation,
the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Ford
Foundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.
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